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ARTICLES

STANDING AT THE CROSSROADS:
THE ROBERTS COURT IN HISTORICAL
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This Article advances a provocative and ironic thesis concerning the
incentives of the Roberts Court respecting standing doctrine, which results
from the Court's increasingly stable center of ideological gravity and the
alignment of that ideology with the overwhelming majority of United States
Courts of Appeals. With additional core conservative appointments, the
Court will be motivated to broaden standing doctrine as did the Warren
Court, the very Court whose historical legacy it seeks to counteract, as a
means of working in combination with the lower federal judiciary to move
doctrine in its preferred doctrinal direction.
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To support this thesis, this Article develops and presents two new sets of
data. Adapting the Martin-Quinn scoring system, the first data set tracks
the ideological center of gravity and the stability of dominant coalition structures on the Supreme Court itselffrom 1937 through 2005. The second data
set is the product of original research drawn from the FederalJudges Biographical Database, compiled by the FederalJudicial Center. These data
track the ideological balance of the federal circuit courts, for each yearfrom
1933 through 2006 based upon the party of appointing President. This
Article transforms these two sets of data into a readily comparableform and
presents them together in a chronological table covering the Supreme Court
and the circuit courtsfrom 1933 through 2006.
This Article relies upon these data to explain the conditions under
which the Supreme Court has historically developed and transformed its principal doctrinal gatekeeper, namely standing, in an effort to control developing constitutional doctrine in concert with the lower federal courts. The
Article then places the Roberts Court in a broader theoretical and empirical
perspective that tracks the Court's internal coalitionstructures and accounts
for the historicalrelationshipbetween ideological dominance on the Supreme
Court and the majority of the federal circuit courts. The analysis helps not
only in assessing the significance of the recent appointments ofJohn Roberts
as ChiefJustice and Samuel Alito as AssociateJustice, but also of potential
future appointments in effecting doctrinal change.
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INTRODUCTION

After eleven years, the longest period in Supreme Court history
with no change in membership, the Roberts Court began in the year
2005, and had two new Justices in early 2006. John Roberts commenced the October 2005 Term as the seventeenth Chief Justice,
replacing William Rehnquist.' And on January 31, 2006, Associate Justice Samuel Alito was sworn in to replace Sandra Day O'Connor, 2 the
first woman on the Court and the Justice widely regarded as having
3
occupied the Rehnquist Court's centrist position.
Given the unique role that the Supreme Court plays in our system
of governance, 4 it should not be surprising that these two appoint1 Chief Justice Roberts was sworn in on September 29, 2005. See Charles Babington & Peter Baker, Roberts Confirmed as 17th Chief Justice: Senate Republicans Are
Unanimous, Democrats Evenly Split, WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 2005, at Al.
2 David D. Kirkpatrick, Alito Sworn in as Justice After Senate Gives Approval, N.Y.

Feb. 1, 2006, at A21.
3 See id. ('Justice Alito succeeds Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the first woman
on the court and its swing vote on abortion rights and other social issues."). The Alito
nomination followed Bush's failed nomination of Harriet Miers, a political advisor
TIMES,

with no judicial experience and little track record concerning the most important and

contentious issues likely to face the Supreme Court. See Mark Silva &Jan Crawford
Greenburg, Bush Makes a Choice to Cheer Conservatives, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 31, 2005, at Al
("Many conservatives were outraged [that] Bush had nominated Miers instead of a
conservative jurist such as Alito, and considered Alito among several of the best
choices available for the court.").

4 With respect to questions of federal law, the Supreme Court sits at the apex of
no fewer than sixty-three independent judicial pyramids. These include fifty state
judicial hierarchies and thirteen federal circuit courts of appeals. See Robert A.
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5
ments have invited substantial academic handwringing. Commentators generally agree that on the nine-Justice Supreme Court, the two
appointments have produced a single-increment move, ideologically,
to the right. 6 While the two Chief Justices, Rehnquist and Roberts,
7
occupy roughly the same ideological, or policy, space, Justice Alito
has thus far proved a reliably more conservative jurist than did justice
O'Connor, whom he replaced. 8
Whereas O'Connor generally occupied the Court's centrist, or
median, position, occasionally joined by, or switching off with the
Court's other moderate conservative, Anthony Kennedy,9 the early evi-

Schapiro, InterjurisdictionalEnforcement of Rights in a Post-Erie World, 46 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1399, 1408 (2005) ("The U.S. Supreme Court stands as the ultimate interpreter
of federal law, reviewing issues of federal law that arise in lower federal courts or in
state courts."). Supreme Court decisions affect not only constitutional interpretation
in such high profile areas as abortion, affirmative action, the First Amendment, separation of powers, and constitutional criminal procedure, but also give meaning to
federal statutes, administrative regulations, and treaties.
5 For examples of contemporaneous articles speculating on the importance of
these appointments, see Joan Biskupic, Bush Appointees Signal Court's New Direction,
USA TODAY, Dec. 20, 2006, at A13; Linda Greenhouse, With O'ConnorRetirement and a
New ChiefJustice Comes an Awareness of Change, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2006, at A10; Erwin
Chemerinsky, Making Confirmation Hearings Meaningful, 115 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 52
(2006), http://yalelawjournal.org/2006/01/chemerinsky.html.
6 See, e.g., Charles H. Whitebread, The 2005-2006 Term of the United States Supreme
Court: A Court in Transition, 28 WHITTIER L. REV. 3, 6 (2006) ("The replacement of
Rehnquist with Roberts did not shift the Court's ideological balance much, but the
substitution of Alito for O'Connor clearly pushed the Court to the right."). The data
for the first year of the Roberts Court Term has proved consistent with this prediction. See infra Part II.C.
7 Rick Klein, Bush Picks Robertsfor ChiefJustice O'ConnorIs Likely to Remain for Now,
BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 6, 2005, at A6 ("[C]onfirming Roberts to replace Rehnquist is
unlikely to alter the political balance on the high court in the same manner that
having him step in for O'Connor would.").
8 Charlie Savage, With Alito, Kennedy Would Have Pivotal Role: On Contentious
Issues, Justice's Vote Would Be Decisive, Scholars Say, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 4, 2005, at A3
(relying upon interviews with legal scholars Cass Sunstein, Jack Balkin, and Richard
Fallon to advance the thesis that the Alito appointment moves the judicial median
position from O'Connor to Kennedy). The data for the first year of the Roberts
Court Term has proved consistent with these predictions. See infra Part II.C.
9 See Andrew D. Martin et al., The MedianJustice on the United States Supreme Court,
83 N.C. L. REV. 1275, 1305 (2005). The authors rely upon their newly developed
statistical method, discussed infra Part II.B, to assert:
Virtually all contemporary commentary stresses the critical role Justice
O'Connor (and, to a lesser extent, Kennedy) plays on the current Court by
casting key votes in many consequential cases. The Martin-Quinn approach
confirms this commentary, showing that O'Connor has been the Court's
median since the 1999 Term.
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dence suggests that Alito, who joined the Court with an established
fifteen-year record as a conservative member of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, has thus far continued
embracing the same general judicial philosophy on the Supreme
Court.' 0 That ideology is more closely aligned with such core conservatives on the Rehnquist Court as the former Chief Justice and Associate Justices Scalia and Thomas, than with Justice O'Connor's
moderate conservative jurisprudence. 1
It now appears that the Roberts Court is one Justice shy of what
conservatives had long hoped for, namely a core conservative majority
that would ensure predictable rulings in such key areas of constitutional law as abortion, equal protection, and criminal procedure.
With an additional conservative judicial appointment, replacing one
of the four remaining liberal Justices-Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg, or
Breyer-or the moderate-conservative Justice Kennedy, the Supreme
Court is poised for a fundamental reworking of several notable constitutional doctrines in a more conservative direction.
While generally sound, this conventional wisdom remains incomplete in a critical respect. Placing the Roberts Court in its proper historical perspective reveals an important feature that has received
surprisingly little attention. The Supreme Court's increasingly promiMartin et al., supra, at 1305.
10 See infra Table 3, year 2005.
11 This is not to suggest that the conservative wing of the Rehnquist Court invariably voted as a bloc. While Rehnquist developed an early reputation as the lone dissenter from sometimes liberal Burger Court rulings, seeJohn Yoo, National Security on
the Rehnquist Court, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1144, 1149 (2006) ("As a young Justice,
[Rehnquist] was known as the 'Lone Ranger' for his solitary dissents."), over time,
commentators came to view Justices Scalia and Thomas, who joined the Court after
Rehnquist, as more reliably conservative, see Lee Epstein & Jeffrey A. Segal, Trumping
the FirstAmendment?, 21 WASH. U.J.L. & PoL'v 81, 98 (2006) (relying upon the Martin-

Quinn scores to support the claim that 'Justices Scalia and Thomas, generally considered the most reliably conservative members of the Rehnquist Court, anchor the right
end, and Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, the left"). And even these two predictable
conservatives occasionally parted company.

See The Supreme Court, 2005 Term-The

Statistics, 120 HARV. L. REv. 372, 375 (2006) (calculating that Scalia and Thomas
agreed in 80% of all nonunanimous cases for the 2005 Term). But occasional disagreements do not detract from the general claim that on the Rehnquist Court, the
Chief Justice and Associate Justices Scalia and Thomas formed a stable and predictable conservative coalition. Most commentators agree that if the two most recent
appointments-Roberts and Alito-fall generally along the ideological space that the
Rehnquist Court conservatives occupied, this will leave Justice Kennedy alone in the
Court's median position. See Savage, supra note 8. Indeed, there is already early case
evidence supporting this result. See infra Appendix A, year 2005 (demonstrating Kennedy to be the median jurist in the first year of the Roberts Court).
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nent conservative center of gravity coincides with an overwhelmingly
conservative set of federal courts of appeals. While this alone is
important, it becomes all the more so when one other consideration is
added. The historical evidence demonstrates that the Supreme Court
has proved willing to relax rules governing access to the federal judiciary, and to the Court itself, when such rules threaten to undermine an
aligned federal judiciary's power to press its emerging doctrinal mandate. This even rarer coincidence of judicial characteristics has happened only one prior time in the post-New Deal period, and that was
during the Warren Court.
This Article's thesis is ironic: with respect to standing doctrine,
which affects federal judicial access and the timing of doctrinal transformation, the Roberts Court is likely to resemble the Warren Court,
the very Court whose historical legacy it seeks to counteract. Further
core conservative appointments to the Roberts Court will place stress
upon strict standing doctrines developed in the Burger and Rehnquist
Courts, as the Supreme Court, working in alignment with the conservative lower federal judiciary, seeks to move substantive constitutional doctrine in its preferred ideological direction. Over time, an
increasingly conservative Roberts Court will seek to relax the strictest
features of standing doctrine to facilitate its broader doctrinal agenda.
To support this thesis, this Article presents two new sets of data.
Adapting the Martin-Quinn scoring system, 12 the first data set tracks
the ideological center of gravity and the stability of dominant coalition structures on the Supreme Court itself from 1937 through 2005.
The second data set is the product of original research drawn from
the Federal Judges Biographical Database, compiled by the Federal
Judicial Center. 13 The newly constructed data set provides the party
of presidential appointment of all federal circuit court judges, by circuit, from 1933 through 2006.14 This Article transforms these data
into a readily comparable form and presents them together in a
chronological table for the entire period. 15 Based upon these data,
the Article then correlates the two critical phenomena in the Supreme
Court: the presence or absence of a stable coalition structure and the
alignment of a dominant center of ideological gravity with the dominant ideology of the majority of the federal courts of appeals.

12 See infra Table 3.
13 See Fed. Judicial Ctr., History of the Federal Judiciary, http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf (last visited Jan. 27, 2008).
14 See infra Appendix C.
15 See infra Table 3.
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These new data are critical to evaluating the Roberts Court
because they demonstrate the conditions under which the Supreme
Court has historically transformed standing doctrine to control the
conditions of developing constitutional doctrine. The data reveal that
the Supreme Court has developed and strengthened standing doctrine to further its perceived doctrinal mandate under either of two
sets of conditions, first when the Court has sought to control the lower
federal courts whose ideological dominance is out of keeping with its
own, and second, when the Court has suffered a loose internal coalition structure that has made it difficult to predict how combining the
members' individual preferences will translate into developing constitutional doctrine. Placing the Roberts Court in a proper historical
perspective, which tracks the Court's internal coalition structures and
which accounts for the relationship between ideological dominance
on the Supreme Court and that of the majority of the federal circuit
courts, helps not only in assessing the significance of the Roberts and
Alito appointments, but also of potential future appointments in
affecting doctrinal change.
Given the provocative nature of this Article's thesis, a few observations are appropriate. First, for much of its history, standing has generally been viewed as a conservative judicial doctrine. The Supreme
Court's most recent pronouncement on standing, Massachusetts v.
EPAI 6-in whichJustice Stevens, writing for a majority of five, granted
Massachusetts standing to challenge the EPA's denial of a petition for
rulemaking governing the emission of greenhouse gases 7 -is certainly consistent with this ideological view of standing doctrine. And
yet, placing the doctrine in a longer historical perspective reveals the
16

127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007).

17 Id. at 1458. Justice Stevens developed the somewhat novel, if not altogether
consistent, theory that Massachusetts' inability to regulate greenhouse gas emissions
effectively on its own supported its claim to standing as a means of protecting its
sovereign interests, see id. at 1454 (citing Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230,
237 (1907)), while simultaneously reasoning that the threat that greenhouse gas emissions would further erode the Commonwealth's coastal property bolstered its claim to
standing, see id. ChiefJustice Roberts andJustice Scalia,joining each other's opinions
andjoined by Justices Thomas and Alito, dissented. The ChiefJustice emphasized the
difficulties of ascribing Article III causation given the seemingly attenuated linkages
between the EPA's failure to regulate carbon emissions on new automobiles and the
specific erosion along the Massachusetts coastline. See id. at 1471 (Roberts, CJ., dissenting) (dubbing the case "SCRAP for a new generation"). Justice Scalia defended
the Agency's reading of the Clean Air Act to exclude greenhouse gas emissions as a
form of "air pollttion" subject to its regulatory powers, and further defended the
Agency's prudential decision to delay regulation in light of other federal initiatives
targeting the reduction of greenhouse gases. See id. at 1473-74 (Scalia,J., dissenting).
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limitation of casting standing in strict ideological terms. The New
Deal Court developed standing as a means of insulating progressive
regulatory reform from attack in a conservative lower federal judiciary
that it feared was committed to obstructing progressivism based upon
a recently discredited set of constitutional barriers.' 8 Of course a doctrine's purpose can shift without ever having its original purpose, or
ideological content, restored. To defend its claim, this Article assesses
the historical functions that standing has served, and the conditions
that have previously motivated the Supreme Court to transform standing doctrine.
Second, historical events could certainly overtake the predictive
thesis on the future direction of standing doctrine, assuming for
example that a Democrat is elected President in 2008. If Democratic
control lasted only a single term, as occurred for example with the
Carter administration,' 9 such an election could interrupt, but not
avert, eventual doctrinal change. Of course, this Article makes no predictions concerning future presidential elections. Moreover, while
one further conservative appointment would undoubtedly strengthen
the Court's conservative center of gravity, further conservative
appointments might be needed before that majority appreciates the
benefits of a relaxed standing doctrine. If, for example, Justice Scalia,
perhaps joined by Chief Justice Roberts, 20 remains committed to a
particular normative theory of standing developed in an earlier
period, it is possible that they will continue to apply the doctrine
strictly, even if relaxing it would further other doctrinal concerns.
Finally, it is important to emphasize that even aside from any predictions concerning the future direction of standing doctrine, this
Article remains important for two independent reasons. First, the
data and analysis presented here substantially corroborate the social
choice account of standing doctrine, thus providing an important
21
means of testing that theory against alternative standing analyses.
18 See infra Part I.B (providing a historical analysis of New Deal standing).
19 See infra Table 3, years 1977-80 (demonstrating that, while having no affect on
the Supreme Court (Carter had no Supreme Court appointments), President Carter
effected a temporary increase in Democratic controlled federal courts of appeals,
which eventually were restored to the prior level of Republican control after Reagan
assumed the presidency, specifically by the year 1986).
20 In his dissenting opinion in Massachusetts v. EPA, the Chief Justice expressed
his continuing support for the formulation of standing expressed in Justice Scalia's
controversial opinion in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). See Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1463-64 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at
560-61).
21 I have previously offered historical and doctrinal analyses that further corroborate this theoretical account of standing. See MAXWELL L. STEARNS, CONSTITUTIONAL
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Second, the newly constructed data have potential applications for a
broad range of inquiries concerning the historical relationship
22
between the Supreme Court and the lower federal judiciary.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides an overview of
standing doctrine. After explaining the theoretical underpinnings of
standing, that Part will discuss the development of standing in the
New Deal, the broadening of standing in the Warren Court, and the
redeployment and strengthening of standing in the Burger and Rehnquist Courts. Part II will present the two new combined databases and
explain the underlying methodology. It will then revisit the history of
standing by tying the essential periods of historical development to
the judicial phenomena revealed in the data. The data not only corroborate several arguments developed in Part I to explain standing,
but also provide an essential framework for considering how future
appointments on the Court are likely to alter existing standing rules
in an effort to affect substantive constitutional doctrine. Part III will
discuss the implications of the data for the emerging Roberts Court
and how relaxing standing is likely to promote that Court's emerging
doctrinal agenda. That Part then takes up potential objections to the
arguments developed in this Article. The Article then briefly
concludes.

215-301 (2000); Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing and Social Choice: HistoricalEvidence, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 309, 348-404 (1995) [hereinafter Stearns, Historical Evidence]; Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing Back from the Forest:Justiciability and Social Choice,
83 CAL. L. REV. 1309, 1320-29 (1995) [hereinafter Stearns, Justiciability].
22 These data, for example, could be used to study claims concerning the
Supreme Court's changing docket size, including, but not limited to, the notable
reduction in cases decided in recent years, see Erwin Chemerinsky, A Look Back at the
Rehnquist Era and an Overview of the 2004 Supreme Court Term, 21 ToURo L. REV. 731,
733 (2006) (noting a fifty percent decline in docket during Rehnquist period); congressional expansions or contractions of Supreme Court review of various federal
claims, including, for example, habeas petitions, see Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 8, 18, 28, 40, 42 U.S.C.); and the historical transition toward an
increasingly discretionary Supreme Court docket, see Supreme Court Case Selections
Act, Pub. L. No. 100-352, §§ 2(a)-(b), 3-4, 102 Stat. 662, 662-63 (1988) (codified at
28 U.S.C. §§ 1254, 1257 (2000)) (providing the Supreme Court with broader discretionary control over its docket).
PROCESS

NOTRE

I.

A.

A

DAME LAW

REVIEW

[VOL. 83:3

BRIEF HISTORY OF TIMING 2 3

The ConceptualProblem of Standing

The standing doctrine is among the most controversial and written-about doctrines in all of United States constitutional law. Henry
Monaghan once wrote that justiciability under Article III governs the
"who" and "when" of federal court litigation. 24 As this subpart will
demonstrate, the most important modern incarnation of Article III
justiciability, namely standing, combines these inquiries, and others,
into a general set of rules that govern how cases testing important
questions of federal law are properly timed. Standing thus affects the
circumstances under which litigants present claims that affect the
most contentious and high profile bodies of substantive constitutional
doctrine.
In the 1970s and 1980s, as standing became an increasingly prominent constraint on developing bodies of federal constitutional law,
the doctrine remained the focus of sustained academic attention and
criticism. 25 The 1990s witnessed a renewed assault on standing doc-

trine after the Rehnquist Court, for the first time, imposed its judi-

26
cially crafted constitutional standing limitations on Congress itself.

23

With apologies to Nobel Laureate Stephen Hawking. See STEPHEN HAWKING, A
(1988).
24 Henry P. Monaghan, ConstitutionalAdjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J.
1363, 1364 (1973).
25 To take but one example, as Professor Gene Nichol has explained, "In perhaps
no other area of constitutional law has scholarly commentary been so uniformly critical." Gene R. Nichol,Jr., Rethinking Standing, 72 CAL. L. REv. 68, 68 (1984); see also id.
at 68 n.3 (citing extensive literature critical of standing doctrine).
26 In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992),Justice Scalia, writing for a
majority, held that Congress lacked the power to confer citizen standing on persons
whose injury was highly attenuated, meaning that it bore little correlation to an injury
cognizable at common law, even though the Endangered Species Act, upon which the
claimants relied, conferred standing upon citizens generally. Id. at 576. In Bennett v.
Spear, 520 US. 154 (1997), the Court later construed the same statute to confer standing upon two irrigation districts and two ranchers who sought to limit the statute's
application to prevent land development where their claim did have a common law
analogue, even though their claim was in tension with the overall thrust of the statute
to preserve the habitats of endangered species. See id. at 161-66. More recently, in
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167
(2000), Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority, began to mark a retreat from the
doctrine announced in Lujan and conferred standing to challenge emissions violations under the Clean Water Act even though the claimed injuries were arguably as
attenuated as the rejected claims in Lujan, the violations did not produce any identifiable environmental harm, and, with one possible exception, the violations did not
cause any direct harm to a claimant. Id. at 187; see also infra Part III.B.2 (discussing
BRIEF HISTORY OF TIME
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In doing so, the Court called into question Congress' power to facilitate a regime of private attorneys general to complement agency
enforcement of federal regulatory schemes, most notably in the area
27
of environmental law.

While standing doctrine has had pervasive effects on substantive
constitutional doctrine, commentators have widely criticized standing
for its seemingly inconsistent applications. A general wisdom concerning standing doctrine holds that every articulated rule comes
equipped with its own unprincipled exceptions. Parties cannot
enforce the rights of others, 28 except when they can. 29 Litigants cannot present diffuse claims,30 unless they are allowed to.3 1 Congress
must strictly adhere to the Supreme Court's constitutional standing
rules, 32 unless it is afforded some flexibility. 3 3 In general, jurists and

commentators maintain that the pervasive inconsistencies in the application of standing doctrine overwhelmingly support claims to an
the claimants' assertion of harm to property values). Not surprisingly, Justice Scalia,
joined by justice Thomas, dissented. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 198 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
27 For a discussion of the sustained academic criticism of Lujan, see Stearns, Historical Evidence, supra note 21, at 327 n.16.
28 See City of L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 110 (1983) (denying standing to a onetime chokehold victim who was seeking to enjoin the Los Angeles Police Department
practice to prevent harm to others when he himself had not been so detained); Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012, 1014-17 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (denying
standing to a mother seeking to challenge her son's conviction and death sentence on
various constitutional grounds).
29 See Gladstone Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 102-03 (1979) (conferring standing on housing testers who were not themselves seeking to secure housing).
30 See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 227-28
(1974) (denying standing to prevent the seating of elected members of Congress who
were serving in the military reserves allegedly in violation of the Incompatibility
Clause); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 170 (1974) (denying standing to
compel the publication of the CIA budget under the Statements and Accounts
Clause).
31 See United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures
(SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 685-90 (1973) (conferring standing upon students seeking to
challenge the suspension of a railroad rate increase on the ground that the result
threatened to compromise the environment in and around Washington, D.C.); Flast
v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101-07 (1968) (conferring standing to challenge the taxexempt status of a sectarian college due to a spending power nexus to claims associated with the Establishment Clause).
32 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 571-76 (1992) (denying standing under the Endangered Species Act where the plaintiffs did not satisfy the requirement of constitutional injury).
33 See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167,
187 (2000) (conferring standing under the Clean Water Act despite the attenuated
nature of the injury in fact and redressability).
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3
underlying political motivation that drives individual case results.

4

While legal scholars have relied upon large numbers of available cases
to support such claims,3 5 a brief review of some prominent standing
decisions from the Burger and Rehnquist Court periods is sufficient to
illustrate the claimed inconsistencies.
Let us begin with some prominent and controversial standing
denials. In City of Los Angeles v. Lyons,3 6 a one-time Los Angeles
chokehold victim was denied standing to enjoin the Los Angeles
Police Department from all future chokeholds, notwithstanding his
claim that as a former chokehold victim, he had a good chance of
being so held in the future. 37 In Gilmore v. Utah,38 Gary Gilmore's
mother was denied standing to challenge her son's conviction and
death sentence based upon several claimed constitutional errors, even
though absent her suit, her son, who was willing to rest on his claims,
was certain to be executed.3 9 In Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop
the War,40 a group of concerned citizens was denied standing 41 to challenge the seating of members of Congress who served in the military
reserves allegedly in violation of the Constitution's Incompatibility
Clause, 4 2 even though absent their suit, it appeared that no one had
43 In Allen v. Wright,4 4
standing to raise the constitutional challenge.
the parents of African American school children were denied standing to challenge an exception to an IRS tax policy that effectively
granted tax-exempt status to private schools alleged to have engaged
in various forms of racial discrimination where those schools fell
under the umbrella of an already tax-exempt organization, despite the
claim that the policy subsidized white flight from the public schools
that the claimants' children attended to the allegedly discriminatory
45
private schools in violation of equal protection.
34 See Stearns, Justiciability, supra note 21, at 1326 n.66 (discussing various scholarly works that claim that standing doctrine is motivated by the political desire to
avoid hard cases or to issue preliminary assessments on the merits).
35 For a comprehensive review of the standing case law, see STEARNs, supra note
21, at 215-301, and Stearns, HistoricalEvidence, supra note 21, at 323-40.
36 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
37 Id. at 110.
38 429 U.S. 1012 (1976).
39 Id. at 1014-17 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
40 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
41 Id. at 227-28.
42 See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 6, cl. 2.
43 See Schlesinger,418 U.S. at 235 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
44 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
45 Id. at 754.
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In contrast, the Supreme Court granted standing in each of the
following cases despite apparent conceptual difficulties respecting the
claimants' injuries. In Duke Power Co. v. Environmental Study Group,
Inc.,46 the Court conferred standing upon property owners who
sought to strike down a federal statutory liability limit for a proposed
nuclear power plant to be built near their homes, even though they
did not allege and could not prove that striking down the challenged
provision would halt the plant's construction. 47 In United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP),48 the Court
granted standing to a group of George Washington Law School students who alleged that the failure to suspend a railroad rate increase
would cause harm to their enjoyment of natural resources in and
around Washington, D.C., in violation of the National Environmental
Policy Act, despite a peculiar and attenuated set of causal links
between the claimed legal violation and the claimed injury. 49 In
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,50 a white medical school
applicant who challenged a state mevlical school's racial set-aside of
sixteen out of one hundred seats was granted standing to present his
equal protection challenge even though he did not allege, and could
not prove, that he would have been admitted to the medical school in
51
the absence of the challenged program.
Standing doctrine is notable not only for such apparent doctrinal
inconsistencies, but also because the animating purposes and form of
standing doctrine have changed substantially over time. While the
modern standing doctrine, as embodied in the case law in the Burger
and Rehnquist Courts, combines constitutional and prudential elements, and more recently has limited Congress' power to confer
standing, 52 the earlier doctrine developed in the New Deal Court
comprised largely prudential constraints on judicial powers that Congress had the authority to strengthen or relax as it saw fit. Because
this doctrinal transformation is central to this Article's main thesis
with respect to the Roberts Court, we now trace the development of
46 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
47 Id. at 81.
48 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
49 Id. at 685-90.
50 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
51 See id. at 275-76, 281 n.14 (opinion of Powell, J.).
52 In Lujan, the Court extended its judicially constructed standing elementsinjury in fact, causation, and redressability-to the question of congressional standing. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). For a summary of the
relevant cases, and the resulting inconsistencies, see sources cited supra note 26.
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standing from the New Deal Court period through the Rehnquist
Court.
B.

Standing in the New Deal Court

Following a series of notable Supreme Court decisions in 1935
that thwarted his New Deal program, 5 3 President Franklin Delano
Roosevelt proposed his infamous Court-packing plan. 54 This plan

would have increased the size of the Court from nine to fifteen members by authorizing the President to appoint an additional Justice for
55
every member over the age of seventy who remained on the Court.
The plan is generally credited for having motivated a change in the
judicial direction the Court itself, and specifically for Justice Owen
Roberts' "switch in time that saved nine. '56 This change in judicial
direction ultimately thwarted the Court-packing plan itself.5 7 By 1937,
FDR no longer needed to change the size of the Court, however, to
effect a profound change in its composition. Instead, during the
course of his long administration, FDR ultimately replaced eight of
53 See, e.g., Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 628-32 (1935)
(preventing FDR from removing the commissioner of the independent Federal Trade
Commission); Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 601-02
(1935) (striking down the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) and the mortgage
moratoria in the Frazier-Lemke Act).
54 For a more detailed discussion, see STEARNs, supra note 21, at 220-23.
55 See KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN &c GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 139-41
(15th ed. 2004); see also Michael Comiskey, Can a PresidentPack-orDraft-the Supreme
Court?, 57 ALB. L. REV. 1043, 1047 (1994) (describing the Court-packing plan).
56 Specifically, by providing the critical fifth vote to sustain a minimum wage law
for women in West CoastHotel v. Parrish,300 U.S. 379 (1937),Justice Roberts retreated
from a seemingly indistinguishable vote cast one year earlier in Morehead v. New York
ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936), thus signaling a new alliance that would treat
progressive regulatory reform more favorably.
57 In addition to West Coast Hote4 the Court issued NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1937) (rejecting a formalist interpretation of the Commerce
Clause to permit congressional regulation of production). In this same period, the
Court also abandoned its recently reified nondelegation doctrine. See A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 542 (1935); Panama Ref. Co.
v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 430 (1935). While the Court had marked a consistent retreat
from disallowing broad delegations earlier, it formally endorsed broad delegations in
Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 426 (1944). SeeJ. Harvie Wilkinson, The Drawbacks
of Growth in the FederalJudiciay,43 EMORY L.J. 1147, 1154 (1994) (discussing the abandonment of the nondelegation doctrine). During this period, the Court also
announced the end of the regime of Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), which
had allowed a conservative parallel federal common law to compete with the common
law of the states. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 77-78 (1938).
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the nine seats, including replacing one seat twice. 58 OnlyJustice Roberts himself remained on the Court throughout the entirety of the
FDR administration.

59

This rapidly changing Court, and its corresponding change of
doctrinal direction, motivated a set of rules that governed federal judicial access. While standing doctrine has long been associated with the
Article III case or controversy requirement, more recently, Supreme
Court historians have called this understanding into question. 60 An
impressive cohort of legal scholars now identify Louis Brandeis and
Felix Frankfurter as the architects of the modern standing doctrine,
and link the rise of the progressive regulatory state to this important
doctrinal innovation. 6 1 The emerging consensus on the historical origins of standing doctrine helps to clarify the form that New Deal
standing took and the time frame during which it was developed. 62 At
the same time, this explanation of the standing doctrine's historical
origins introduces its own set of anomalies.
The emerging New Deal Court that FDR forged was characterized
by a progressive judicial philosophy that came to operate in tension
with legal doctrines favored by a dominant conservative lower federal
judiciary. 63 The New Deal standing doctrine limited the power of the
58 See infra Appendix A (identifying all of the Supreme Court appointments for
the relevant period in a chronological timeline).
59 See infra Appendix A.
60 See generally Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of SelfGovernance, 40 STAN. L. REv. 1371, 1417-57 (1990).
61 Professor Winter's rather recent, and once revisionist, assertion that standing
was developed in the New Deal period and was the brainchild of Felix Frankfurter
and Louis Brandeis, see id. at 1441-52, has since become part of the canon of Constitutional Law. See Steven L. Winter, The Meaning of "Under Color of' Law, 91 MICH. L.
REv. 323, 333 n.48 (1992) (expressing surprise at the speed with which his once novel
historical account has been "consigned to the general stock of conventional
wisdom").
62 To be clear, the emerging consensus has invited a new counter-revisionism that
seeks to ground standing doctrine in an earlier period. See Ann Woolhandler & Caleb
Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine?, 102 MICH. L. REv. 689, 704-07 (2004)
(arguing that the modern standing doctrine is not inconsistent with practices in the
Founding period). Resolving this historical question is unnecessary for our immediate purposes. This Article's essential thesis holds whether we view the New Deal
period as the point of origin for the standing doctrine, or instead as a period that
renewed a once prorogued standing doctrine.
63 Table 3, for example, reveals that when FDR took office, all but one circuit
were dominated by Republican appointed judges. See infra Table 3, year 1933. While
this conservative majority was reduced over time, it persisted until nearly the end of
his second administration. See infra Table 3, years 1933-39. Commentators have
identified 1937 as a landmark year for the transformation of at least two important
conservative constitutional doctrines. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Mistakes of
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lower federal courts to persistendy challenge the Supreme Court's
own rapidly changing set of substantive constitutional doctrines, most
notably involving due process, the Commerce Clause, the nondelegation doctrine, and Erie. Collectively, these emerging liberal doctrines
helped facilitate progressive federal and state regulatory intervention
into a failing market economy. 64 The New Deal Court developed
modern standing doctrine from an available metaphor imbedded
within the earliest federal court cases. The metaphor, to "stand," conveyed the requirement that, to invoke a federal court's equitable powers, a litigant, or her representative, had to stand at the bar of the
court. 65 The New Deal Court built upon this prudential limit on fed-

eral equitable power to construct a set of doctrines that combined to
further an altogether different set of purposes. The new standing
doctrine, which operated as a set of presumptive, or default, rulesrules that Congress was fully empowered to change-simultaneously
protected Congress' progressive regulatory reform and newly developing substantive Supreme Court doctrines that insulated such reform
1937, 11 CEO. MASON L. REV., Winter 1988, at 5, 7-20 (discussing changes in Due
Process and Commerce Clause doctrines). The data for 1937 reveal that the circuit
courts continued to be heavily dominated by conservative judicial appointees. See
infra Table 3, year 1937.
64

See Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatizationof Public Law, 88 COLUM. L.

REv. 1432, 1437 (1988) (observing that "courts favorably disposed toward the New
Deal reformation developed doctrines of standing, ripeness, and reviewability largely
to insulate agency decisions from judicial intervention," and that "[s]uch doctrines
were used enthusiastically by judges associated with the progressive movement and
the New Deal, most prominently justices Brandeis and Frankfurter, who reflected the
prevailing belief that traditional conceptions of the rule of law were incompatible
with administrative regulation").
65 See generally Winter, supra note 60, at 1382-83 (describing the conceptual origins of the standing metaphor). Then Professor (now federal appeals court judge)
William Fletcher has observed that "[t] he creation of a separately articulated and selfconscious law of standing can be traced to two overlapping developments in the last
half-century: the growth of the administrative state and an increase in litigation to
articulate and enforce public, primarily constitutional, values." William A. Fletcher,
The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 225 (1988). While linking modern standing
doctrine to progressivism explains why early federal practice did not imbed modern
justiciability norms, it nonetheless raises its own anomaly. This theory does not
explain why the more conservative Burger and Rehnquist Courts, which were more
skeptical of the benefits of the progressive regulatory state, entrenched, and indeed
constitutionalized, standing, rather than cutting it back. See Stearns, Justiciability,
supra note 21, at 1323. The social choice model of standing helps resolve this question by linking the more modern doctrinal form that standing has taken to the difficulty that these later Courts had in anticipating their own abilities to process collective
preferences into predictable doctrinal outputs. See generally sources cited supra note
21.
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from attack in federal courts of law. The standing doctrine, in particular, insulated the Supreme Court's newly developing constitutional
doctrine from the risk of repeated challenges in conservative lower
federal courts.
Under the New Deal standing doctrine, Congress retained the
power to confer or deny standing in specific statutes as it saw

fit.

66

The doctrinal innovation involved handling standing in the absence
of any statutory directive. Under the New Deal Court's standing doctrine, absent federal statutory guidance, claimed injuries with an analogue in the common law of contract, property, or tort were presumed
justiciable, while other claimed injuries were presumed nonjusticiable. 67 This novel standing doctrine effectively limited the power to
challenge the emerging regulatory state, which created harms that
were not necessarily or invariably correlated with common law understandings of injury. And it did so without having to revisit the merits
of adverse lower court holdings concerning newly developing constitutional doctrine that facilitated a progressive regulatory agenda.
C.

Standing in the Warren Court

The circumstances that gave rise to the Warren Court were certainly more fortuitous than the somewhat blunt use-or at least
66 For statutory illustrations, see, for example, Communications Act of 1934, 47
U.S.C. § 402(b)(6) (2000) (conferring standing upon "any .. . person ... aggrieved
or whose interests are adversely affected by any order of the [Federal Communications] Commission"); Act of Mar. 20, 1933, ch. 3, § 5, 48 Stat. 8, 9 (repealed 1957)
(precluding veterans from challenging agency denials of benefits in federal court).
For a discussion of the presumptive nature of New Deal standing rules, which linked

justiciability to whether the claimed injury found an analogue in the common law of
tort, contract, or property, but which allowed Congress to change its standing presumptions, see Fletcher, supra note 65, at 226-27 & nn. 34-39.
67 See, e.g., FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 476-77 (1940)
(granting standing to evaluate a claimed injury that the Commission was not legally
obligated to consider); Tenn. Elec. Power Co. v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 306 U.S. 118,
137-47 (1939) (denying standing to challenge the TVA's regulatory conduct where
the plaintiff did not claim a legal right grounded in property, contract, or tort); Ala.
Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464, 480 (1938) (denying standing to challenge federal
loans and grants to competing municipal utilities and holding that the plaintiff had
no right to be immune from lawful municipal competition). For a later decision from
the Vinson Court era that follows the same general approach, see Joint Anti-Fascist
Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 152 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
(linking the standing inquiry to infringement of comparable common law injury).
For an informative article that reviews this historical period, see Fletcher, supra note
65, at 225-27.
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threat-of political force that gave rise to the New Deal Court. 68 In
1952, fifteen years after the landmark year 1937, which witnessed a
dramatic turnabout in longstanding Supreme Court doctrines, 69 the
newly elected Republican President, Dwight D. Eisenhower, declared
his intent to appoint Justices whose mission would be to restore the
Supreme Court to a more modest role. Although Eisenhower ulti7°
mately appointed five Justices during his two term administration,
historical events undermined his efforts and instead produced a strikingly contrary result.7 1 Two of President Eisenhower's five Supreme
Court appointments, the new Chief Justice, Earl Warren (replacing
Vinson), and Associate Justice William Brennan (replacing Minton),
provided the political and intellectual leadership for what became a
second liberal Supreme Court revolution. And yet, while both the
New Deal and Warren Courts are each rightly characterized as liberal,
contrasting their doctrinal agendas reveals the inherent limitation of
relying upon simple ideological labels to capture evolving judicial
norms. The liberal transformation from New Deal progressivism to an
emerging judicially enforceable, rights-driven jurisprudence proved
dramatic not only for developing doctrine, but also for the ground
rules governing the processes through which such doctrine is made.
By the end of the Eisenhower administration, holdovers
appointed by FDR and Truman joined the recently appointed Chief
Justice Warren and Associate Justice Brennan to forge a new dominant liberal bloc. This emerging bloc effectively transformed an era
of progressive judicial restraint into one of new liberal judicial activism. The liberal Warren Court bloc was reinforced with further
68 For a more detailed discussion, see STEARNS, supra note 21, at 373 nn.49-50,
and sources cited therein.
69 See sources cited supra notes 56-57.
70 In addition to appointing Earl Warren and William Brennan, discussed in the
text, Eisenhower appointedJohn M. Harlan (replacingJackson), Charles E. Whittaker
(replacing Reed), and Potter Stewart (replacing Burton). For a timeline of Supreme
Court appointments, see GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, at lxxxii-xcii (5th ed. 2005); see also infra Appendix A (charting the composition of the
Supreme Court and the Martin-Quinn score of each Justice from 1937-2005).
71 The Earl Warren appointment was the result of a political compromise that
secured Eisenhower the Republican nomination in 1952 against Warren, who had
been a competing candidate. See STEARNS, supra note 21, at 231. Eisenhower promised the first Supreme Court vacancy to Warren, not anticipating (and hoping to
avoid) the result that the vacancy was for Chief Justice. See id. For an informative
discussion, see RICHARD HODDER-WILLIAMS, THE POLITICS OF THE US SUPREME COURT
27-33 (1980). For a discussion of the Brennan appointment, see StephenJ. Wermiel,
The Nomination ofJustice Brennan: Eisenhower's Mistake? A Look at the HistoricalRecord, 11
CONST. COMMENT. 515 (1994-1995).
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appointments during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations and
lasted into the Nixon administration.
The Warren Court is most well known for innovative substantive
doctrines involving the First Amendment, constitutional criminal procedure, and individual rights. 72 The justiciability doctrines developed

to protect the power of Congress and state legislatures to enact progressive regulatory reforms threatened to inhibit new constitutional
claims that did not depend upon legislative enactment. Instead, the
emerging Warren Court jurisprudence turned on novel judicial constructions of open-ended constitutional clauses, including most notably the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. Standing doctrines
that presumptively restricted entry to the federal courts in the absence
of an injury with an analogue to those cognizable at common law
threatened to thwart, rather than to further, this new liberal rightsdriven agenda. As a result, the Warren Court was motivated to relaxand specifically to broaden-the once-restrictive standing rules.
Because the Warren Court's liberal jurisprudence rested on a significant expansion of judicially recognized rights, it also required more
open access to the federal judiciary.
While most widely known for developing liberal bodies of substantive constitutional law, the Warren Court is also known for having
broadened standing and justiciability more generally. In the 1962
decision, Baker v. Carr,73 the Warren Court effectively reversed longstanding precedent, dating to the landmark 1849 decision, Luther v.
Borden,7 4 which had held that a federal court challenge to the claimed
lawful state government in Rhode Island is nonjusticiable under the
clause that guarantees "a Republican Form of Government." 75 While
the merits of the Luther decision are debated-as is whether the original holding supports the broad doctrine ascribed to it 76 -for decades
the Court read Luther to bar as nonjusticiable claims that would have
allowed a federal court to entertain virtually any challenge to state
lawmaking procedures on grounds that they do not satisfy the require72 See Barry Friedman, The History of the CountermajoritarianDifficulty, Part One: The
Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333, 432-33 (1998) (discussing the War-

ren Court's legacy).
73 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
74 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
75 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 4; see Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 46-47.
76 See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., JudicialReview and the Political Question Doctrine: Reviving the Federalist "RebuttablePresumption"Analysis,80 N.C. L. REv. 1165, 1193-95 (2002)
(discussing the history of Luther and concluding that "[t]he Court did not hold that

all complaints under the Guarantee Clause raised political questions").

NOTRE DAME

LAW

REVIEW

[VOL. 83:3

ments of the Guarantee Clause. 77 Most notably, the Court extended
this to bar, among other claims, challenges to state apportionment
formulas on the ground that these claims presented nonjusticiable
political questions. 78 In Baker, the Warren Court marked a peculiar
retreat that honored Luther in the breach. Specifically, Justice Brennan, writing for a majority, reasoned that while the political question
doctrine continued to bar challenges to historical reapportionment
formulas that disadvantaged voters in densely populated districts
when the claim was premised upon the Guarantee Clause, it did not
bar such challenges resting instead on equal protection. 79 In addition, on the specific question of standing, the Baker Court determined
that the disadvantaged voters had standing to press their equal protection challenge80

In 1965, the Warren Court issued the famous decision Griswold v.
Connecticut."' The Griswold case is most famous for holding that the
State of Connecticut could not bar access to contraceptives for married couples without violating the newly propounded right of privacy. 8 2 The privacy right was later transformed from protecting the
physical aspects of marital intimacy to protecting intimate decisionmaking in matters respecting procreation,8 3 thus forming the basis for
the right to abort.8 4 Griswold is also important, however, for its liberal
holding respecting third party standing. The Griswold Court held that
because the married couple might be less effective in pressing their
own privacy claim, their physician had standing as an accessory to the

77 See id. at 1194-95.
78 See id. at 1195 (observing that Luther and its progeny "eventually metamorphosed into a full-blown ban on Republican Form of Government claims beginning
in 1912"). To be clear, the political question doctrine and standing doctrine form
separate, yet overlapping, considerations. The point here is not to equate the two,
but rather to show that the Warren Court relaxed both doctrines as a means of
increasing federal judicial access with respect to claims that were in furtherance of its
rights-driven agenda-in this instance, the right to have one's vote afforded proper
weight. See id. at 1194.
79 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 226-29 (1962).
80 See id. at 206.
81 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
82

See id. at 485-86.

83

In Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), the Court applied equal protection

principles to extend the Griswoldholding to cover access to contraceptives by nonmaried couples. See id. at 453-55.
84 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153-54 (1973).
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underlying offense in providing them with contraceptives to raise that
85
claim on their behalf.
And, in 1968, the Warren Court issued the famous standing decision Flast v. Cohen.86 In F/ast, the Supreme Court distinguished the
1923 decision, Frothingham v. Mellon,8 7 which had prevented a claimant from invoking federal equitable powers to enjoin enforcement of
the Maternity Act of 1921, based upon a claim that enforcement
would unconstitutionally expend federal tax dollars.8 8 The Flast
majority distinguished Frothinghamand granted standing to a taxpayer
who challenged the expenditure of federal funds to a religious organization based upon the peculiar nexus between citizen taxpayer status
and a claimed violation of the Establishment Clause. 8 9
Finally, consider Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.90
While Trafficante was decided in the early part of the Burger Court,
this unusual unanimous decision is largely consistent with the more
expansive Warren Court justiciability jurisprudence. In Trafficante,
the Supreme Court relied upon the Civil Rights Act of 1968,91 a federal statute, to confer standing upon two residents of a housing com92
plex, one black and one white, suing as private attorneys general.
The Court observed that under the statute even "those who were not
the direct objects of discrimination had an interest in ensuring fair
housing, as they too suffered." 93 In one of the most expansive assertions concerning statutory standing, Justice Thurgood Marshall relied
upon Trafficante one year later, in Linda PKS. v. Richard D.,9 4 for the
following proposition: "But Congress may enact statutes creating legal
rights, the invasion of which creates standing, even though no injury
95
would exist without the statute."
85 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 481 ("The rights of husband and wife, pressed here, are
likely to be diluted or adversely affected unless those rights are considered in a suit
involving those who have this kind of confidential relation to them.").

86 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
87 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
88 See id. at 486-89.
89 See Flast, 392 U.S. at 104-06. The Court later retreated from the broad Flast
standing analysis in Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 488-90 (1982).

90 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
91 Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Star. 73 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
18, 25, 42 U.S.C.).
92 Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 206-07, 210-12.
93 Id. at 210.
94

410 U.S. 614 (1973).

95 Id. at 617 n.3 (citing Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 212 (White, J., concurring)).
While we will next consider standing in the Burger and Rehnquist Courts, it is worth
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D. Standing in the Burger and Rehnquist Courts
While President Nixon's four Supreme Court appointments did
not emerge as consistently conservative picks, on balance, they moved
the Court in a more conservative direction. Nixon appointed Chief
Justice Warren Burger (replacing Earl Warren) and Associate Justices
William Rehnquist (replacing John Harlan), Lewis Powell (replacing
Hugo Black), and Harry Blackmun (replacing Abe Fortas).96 In part
as a result of the appointments themselves-Harry Blackmun moved
noting here that as part of the Rehnquist Court's standing jurisprudence, it imposed
stringent limits on Congress' power to confer standing upon private attorneys general. Thus, in Lujan, Justice Scalia, writing for a narrow majority, insisted that claimants who rely upon federal statutes conferring standing must still demonstrate the
constitutional prerequisites of injury in fact, causation, and redressability. Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). The Lujan Court went on to
state that "[n] othing in this contradicts the principle that [t] he ...

injury required by

Art. III may exist solely by virtue of statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which
creates standing."' Id. at 578 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975)).
The Court further stated:
Both of the cases used by Linda R.S. as an illustration of that principle
involved Congress' elevating to the status of legally cognizable injuries concrete, defacto injuries that were previously inadequate in law (namely, injury
to an individual's personal interest in living in a racially integrated community), and injury to a company's interest in marketing its product free from
competition. As we said in Sierra Club, "[Statutory] broadening [of] the categories of injury that may be alleged in support of standing is a different
matter from abandoningthe requirement that the party seeking review must
himself have suffered an injury."
Id. (final emphasis added) (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 738 (1972)). Commentators generally regard
Lujan as working a fundamental transformation in the power of Congress to define
new injuries and to allow private attorneys general to pursue claims based upon those
injuries in federal court. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan ? Of
Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and Article Ill, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 209-15 (1992).
96 See infra Appendix A. This Appendix identifies all appointments in a chronological timeline. Because the discussion to follow requires an analysis of the relationships between coalitions on the Burger and Rehnquist Courts, this subpart will
include a discussion of data presented more formally in Appendix A. References to
data taken from this Appendix will include the relevant column numbers (or Chief
where appropriate) and years. Unless otherwise specified, the remaining descriptions
in this subpart will follow the scoring system developed in Part II.B. Under this system, scores lower than -0.75 are liberal, scores between -0.75 through 0.75 are moderate, and scores higher than 0.75 are conservative. For a more detailed description of
this scoring system and how it relates to the original scoring system developed by
Andrew Martin and Kevin Quinn (the "Martin-Quinn scoring system"), see infra Part
II.B. In addition, where helpful, references will contrast the original Martin-Quinn
formulation with the modified presentation developed in Part II.B.
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to the Court's liberal wing, 97 and Lewis Powell emerged as the often
controlling moderate conservative 9 8-the Burger Court approached
doctrinal change in fits and starts. While the Court nibbled at the
edges of liberal Warren Court precedents, it was not able to move
doctrine in a predictably more conservative direction. 99 And indeed,
as suggested in the discussion of Trafficante, 00 some early Burger
Court cases are most easily understood as continuing the Warren
Court legacy. 10 1
President Ford appointed John Paul Stevens, who, although starting out as a moderate, emerged by the late 1980s as a solid member of
the Court's liberal wing. 10 2 The Carter administration made no
Supreme Court appointments. 10 3 President Reagan's four appointments had a similarly mixed legacy. Reagan elevated Associate Justice
Rehnquist to Chief Justice (replacing Burger), 1 0 4 appointed Associate
Justices Sandra Day O'Connor (replacing Potter Stewart and emerg97 See infra Appendix A, column 3, years 1970-93. Based upon the newly developed scoring system, see supra note 96, Blackmun ranked conservative from 1970-75,
moderate from 1976-84, and liberal from 1985-93.
98 See infra Appendix A, column 2, years 1971-86 (demonstrating that Powell was
conservative from 1971-75, moderate from 1976-77, conservative from 1978-83,
moderate in 1984, conservative in 1985, moderate in 1986; thus clearly justifying the
description "moderate conservative").
99 See JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL,JR. 12 (1994) (offering a
consistent description of the Burger Court); STEARNS, supra note 21, at 235 (providing
illustrations of hybrid Burger Court decisions). See generallyTHE BURGER COURT (Vincent Blasi ed., 1983) (discussing the Burger Court's treatment of First Amendment,
individual rights, and economic issues and comparing those analyses with the Warren
Court's jurisprudence).
100

See supra notes 90-95 and accompanying text.

101 In addition to the standing cases, consider Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,
453-55 (1972) (extending the right to use contraceptives to unmarried couples based
upon equal protection), and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-54 (1973) (finding a
fundamental right to terminate a pregnancy), which extended the famous Warren
Court decision, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (invalidating a
Connecticut statute criminalizing the use of contraceptives by married couples based
upon right to marital privacy).
102 See infra Appendix A, column 5, years 1975-2005. The data demonstrate that
Stevens initially began voting liberal according to the Martin-Quinn scoring system
beginning in 1976, but voted moderate using this Article's scoring system from 1976
through 1988. Thereafter, he voted consistently liberal under both systems.
103

See infra Appendix A, years 1977-80.

104 During his tenure as Chief, Rehnquist remained conservative, as he had been
while Associate Justice, see infra Appendix A, column 8, years 1971-85, but over time
staked out a less extreme conservative position, see infra Appendix A, Chief column,
years 1986-2004.
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ing as a moderate conservative),105 Antonin Scalia (replacing Rehn-

quist upon his elevation to Chief Justice and emerging as a dominant
force on the conservative wing), 10 6 and Anthony Kennedy (replacing
Lewis Powell and joining O'Connor as a moderate conservative). 107
The first President Bush made two appointments, Associate Justice
David Souter (replacing William Brennan, and also moving toward
the liberal wing) a0 and Clarence Thomas (replacing Thurgood Marshall and joining the Court's conservative wing).109
Finally, President Clinton appointed Associate justices Ruth
Bader Ginsburg (replacing Byron White and joining the liberal
wing) 110 and Stephen Breyer (replacing Harry Blackmun and joining
the liberal wing)."' The cumulative effect of these appointments,
which ended when Breyerjoined the Court in 1994 and which left the
105 See infra Appendix A, column 9, years 1981-2004. The data reveal that
O'Connor voted conservative for years 1981-90, moderate from 1991-92, conservative in 1993, moderate from 1994-95, conservative from 1996-97, and moderate from
1998-2004. As with Justice Powell, see supra note 98, and Justice Kennedy, see infra
note 107, the data amply support describing Justice O'Connor as a moderate
conservative.
106 See infra Appendix A, column 8, years 1986-2004. The data reveal that Scalia
began, and has remained, a solid conservative throughout his Supreme Court career,
and the Martin-Quinn scores additionally reveal that his degree of conservatism has
generally increased steadily over time.
107 President Reagan appointed Justice Kennedy following the failed nominations
of Robert Bork and Douglas Ginsburg. George J. Church, FarMore Judicious, TIME,
Nov. 23, 1987, at 16, 16. ForJustice Kennedy's ideological record, see infta Appendix
A, column 2, 1987-2005. The data reveal that Kennedy was a conservative from
1987-90, a moderate in 1991, a conservative in 1992, a moderate from 1993-98, a
conservative from 1999-2002, and a moderate from 2003-05. Once again, Justice
Kennedy is aptly described as a moderate conservative. See supra note 98 (describing
Justice Powell as moderate conservative); see also supra note 105 (describing Justice
O'Connor as moderate conservative).
108 See infra Appendix A, column 4, years 1990-2005. Justice Souter voted as a
conservative in 1990, as a moderate from 1991-96, and as a liberal beginning in 1997.
It is notable that under the Martin-Quinn scoring system Souter's liberal scores have
steadily risen throughout his career.
109 See infra Appendix A, column 6, years 1991-2005. Justice Thomas voted as a
conservative throughout his career and, using the Martin-Quinn scoring system, has a
notably stronger conservative score than does Justice Scalia, see infraAppendix A, column 8, years 1991-2005, for every year that both have served on the Supreme Court.
110 See infra Appendix A, column 7, years 1993-2005. Ginsburg voted as a moderate from 1993-95, and as a liberal, with an increasing liberal score under the MartinQuinn index, every year thereafter.
111 See infra Appendix A, column 3, years 1994-2005. Justice Breyer voted as a
moderate from 1994-95, and as a liberal, with relatively more consistent scores under
the Martin-Quinn index as compared with Justice Ginsburg for the same period, see
infra Appendix A, column 7, years 1994-2005.
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Court unchanged for eleven years until John Roberts became Chief
Justice in October 2005, created a Court with seven Republican
appointees and two Democratic appointees. And yet the historical
record reveals that the party of presidential appointment is of only
limited value in capturing probable ideological positioning of individ1 2
ual Justices over time once they have joined the Court.
The most notable characteristic of the Supreme Court during the
Burger and Rehnquist periods is the emergence of three persistent,
but nondominant blocs." 3 Unlike the Warren Court in which the liberal bloc was generally dominant for an extended period, the Burger
and Rehnquist Courts were characterized by less predicable alliances
that often defied expectations, as the liberals, moderates, and conservatives grappled with doctrines that sometimes tested old-and sometimes forged new-alliances.114
As a result of the new coalition structures within the Supreme
Court itself, the Burger and Rehnquist Courts redeployed standing to
further a different set of purposes than those motivating the establishment of New Deal standing or than those motivating the broadening
of standing in the Warren Court. The Burger and Rehnquist Courts
redeployed standing to limit the power of ideologically motivated litigants to favorably order cases during a period in which the Court's
loose internal coalition structures rendered substantive constitutional
doctrine increasingly dependent upon the order of case presenta112 For an article evaluating Martin-Quinn scores to assess presidential appointment strategies resulting from the prospect of ideological drift, see Ward Farnsworth,
The Use and Limits of Martin-Quinn Scores to Assess Supreme Court Justices, with Special

Attention to the Problem of Ideological Drift, 101 Nw. U. L. REv. 1891 (2007). Professor
Farnsworth questions the significance of findings of ideological drift in light of,
among other concerns, presidential expectations based upon the appointee's prior
experience and strategic considerations at the time of the appointments themselves.
See id. at 1900-03. Resolving these important questions is not necessary to this Article's thesis. The purpose of Table 3, infra, which relies upon the Martin-Quinn
scores, is not to assess the ideological positioning of individual jurists over time, which
the authors refer to as drift, but rather to assess the stability of ideological coalitions
within the Supreme Court and to compare the Court's ideological center of gravity
with that of the federal courts of appeals in particular historical periods.
113 It is worth noting the essentially consistent results that emerge from comparing
the newly developed ideological scoring system applied to particular Justices in this
subpart, and discussed more fully in Part II.B., with the categorizations of individual
Justices, based upon general ideological reputation and case analysis, in STEARNS,
supra note 21, at 236 tbl. 5.1. For a discussion based upon the data developed in
Table 3, see infra Part I.D.4.
114 See generally STEARNS, supra note 21, at 234-44 (discussing the various unpredictable alignments of Justices that emerged on the Burger and Rehnquist Courts in
the context of social choice theory).
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tions. 11 5 To further these objectives, these emerging conservative
Courts gave the standing doctrine, along with the related justiciability
doctrines, ripeness and mootness, a constitutional cast that included
borrowed and adapted common law tort elements of injury in fact,
causation, and redressability, to further a very different set of objectives. 1 16 A proper historical perspective thus demonstrates that, from
its inception in the New Deal Court, the standing doctrine has evolved
as a fluid response to changing dynamics affecting the Supreme
Court's ability to further its emerging doctrinal mandate. 1 7 In the
Burger and Rehnquist periods, in contrast, the Court transformed
standing into a set of rules that disciplined its own docket, along with
those of the lower federal courts, at a time when the Court itself faced
unique difficulties in transforming the doctrinal preferences of its
members into predictable and coherent opinions and doctrines. a18
We have already reviewed some prominent standing decisions
from this historical period. 1 9 Reconsidering two Burger Court standing cases will help to illustrate some of the conceptual difficulties that
conventional analyses have confronted in grappling with this impor115 For a more thorough development of this thesis, see id. at 249-301; see also
infra Part I.D (discussing the development of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts'
restrictive standing requirements and explaining those requirements as a means of
raising barriers to litigant path manipulation).
116 See STEARNS, supra note 21, at 166-70 (discussing standing elements drawn
from tort).
117 To be clear, like Congress, the Supreme Court is a "they," not an "it." See
Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a "They, "Not an "It": Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12
INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 239, 240-49 (1992). As a result, the notion of a perceived
doctrinal mission characterizes the combined understanding of an emerging dominant bloc of Court members, rather than that of any individual member or of the
institution as a whole. Indeed, appreciating that institutions operate through the
interests of their members is a central insight of public choice. See MAXWELL L.
STEARNS & TODD ZYWICKI, PUBLIC CHOICE CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS IN LAW (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript ch. 1). The essential argument developed in the text is
simply that as a dominant Supreme Court coalition emerges, either as a result of a
series of carefully planned presidential appointments, or through a combination of
more fortuitous events, the emerging dominant coalition often perceives a set of doctrinal mandates. See id. These mandates, which are motivated by perceptions that
existing doctrines are problematic, then motivate the dominant coalition to reconceive related rules, like standing and justiciability, which affect the Court's ability to
bring about substantive doctrinal change.
118 For a discussion of the necessary complementarity of standing and certiorari,
which demonstrates why docket control is alone insufficient to further the goal of
preventing litigant path manipulation, see STEARNS, supranote 21, at 194-97, explaining the ability to effectively force certiorari through manufactured circuit splits absent
the combination of docket control and standing.
119 See supra notes 36-51 and accompanying text.
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tant doctrine. A simple doctrinal analysis reveals that flipping the analytical paradigms used to assess standing in Bakke and in Allen would
have produced opposite results in each case. Applying the doctrinal
framework used to grant standing to Mr. Bakke on the Allen facts
would have resulted in granting standing to the Allen plaintiffs, while
applying the doctrinal framework used to deny to the Allen claimants
on the Bakke facts would have resulted in denying standing to Bakke.
This seeming malleability of analytical frameworks merely serves to
reinforce political accounts of standing doctrine even though a more
careful analysis of these and other standing cases demonstrates such
explanations to be nonrobust. 120 Exploring the limitations of the
political account, however, helps to explain the important role of
standing doctrine in controlling the timing of developing Supreme
Court doctrine.
Justice O'Connor, writing for the Allen Court, denied standing on
the ground that the injury to the claimants' children, who attended
public schools, was analytically attenuated from the challenged IRS
tax policy.1 2 1 Because the claimants' children had not applied to or
been denied admission to the schools alleged to have engaged in discriminatory practices, any benefit that the claimants' children would
receive from striking the policy depended upon: (1) the number of
schools receiving tax-exempt status; (2) the effect of withdrawing taxexempt status on any particular school's policies respecting race; (3)
the decisions of parents concerning where to place their children as a
result of a potential change in school racial policies or based upon the
financial implications of maintaining prior policies; and (4) the possibility that a sufficient number of parents and schools would change
their placement decisions or racial policies to have any discernible
effect on public school enrollment at the schools that those children
attended. 122
In contrast, in Bakke, the Court employed an alternative analytical
framework that resulted in finding that the claimant had suffered a
justiciable injury for purposes of standing. Writing an opinion that
expressed the Court's judgment, parts of which no other Justices
joined, 12 3Justice Powell reasoned that even though it was quite possible that Bakke would not have been admitted in the absence of the
120 For a broader presentation that demonstrates the robust nature of the social
choice account briefly summarized here, see supra note 21 and the citations therein.
121 See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 756-57, 766 (1984).
122 See id. at 758.
123 For a discussion that analyzes Justice Powell's Bakke opinion, see Michael
Abramowicz & Maxwell Steams, DefiningDicta,57 STAN. L. REV. 953, 961-73, 1076-78
(2005).

NOTRE

DAME

LAW

REVIEW

[VOL. 83:3

race-based affirmative action program, Bakke nonetheless suffered a
justiciable injury for purposes of standing as a result of his inability to
24
compete for all 100 seats without regard to his race.1
The Allen claimants alleged that the challenged IRS policy effectively prevented the markets for public and private school education
from sorting in a manner that would afford their children a better
opportunity for an integrated public school education, one unimpeded by allegedly unconstitutional federally subsidized white
flight.1 2 5 The Allen Court instead denied standing on the ground that
the causal linkage between the challenged law and the ultimate benefit of an integrated education rendered the claimed injury attenuated. 126 While the Allen Court identified no fewer than four links in
the chain of causation from injury to redress,1 27 an equal number of
theoretical hurdles stood between the challenged affirmative action
program in Bakke and Bakke's ultimate objective of admission to medical school. In spite of that, the Bakke Court conferred standing on
the ground that the Board of Regents had failed to afford Bakke a fair
128
opportunity to compete.
Flipping the analyses to achieve opposite results is now an easy
task. Defining the Allen injury as an opportunity injury-without
regard to the result, claimants sought only an opportunity for an integrated public education that was unencumbered by the allegedly
unconstitutional IRS policy-would result in conferring standing.
Conversely, defining the Bakke injury as one for ultimate admission
exposes a comparably problematic number of causal linkages: (1)
whether U.C. Davis would substitute some other, less vulnerable, program in place of the racial set-aside; (2) whether any new policy would
affect the outcomes for particular minority and nonminority applicants at U.C. Davis; (3) whether the changed policy would encourage
more highly qualified nonminority applicants to apply to U.C. Davis;
and (4) whether the altered pool of all applicants at U.C. Davis and
other medical schools would affect Bakke's ultimate prospect for
admission to U.C. Davis. Consistent with Allen, defining the Bakke
injury as a claim for ultimate relief in the form of admission-one

124

See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 280 (1978) (opinion of

Powell, J.).
125
126
127
128

See
See
See
See

Allen, 468 U.S. at 743-44.
id. at 757-59.
id. at 758.
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 280 n.14 (opinion of Powell, J.).
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unimpeded by these or other causal theoretical impediments to ultimate relief' 29-would result in denying standing.
Such examples of doctrinal inconsistency would be less problematic but for standing doctrine's pervasive influence over entire bodies
of high profile substantive constitutional doctrine. In addition to
equal protection, the subject of the immediately preceding cases,
standing has shaped doctrinal developments in such wide ranging
areas as the right of privacy,13 0 the First Amendment,13 1 constitutional
criminal procedure,

3

2

and environmental law. 1 33 This list is not

exhaustive. To understand how the Supreme Court uses its timingbased justiciability doctrines to affect the development of substantive
doctrine, we must now consider an alternative social choice account of
standing doctrine.
1. A Social Choice Account of Standing in the Burger and
Rehnquist Courts
What follows is a very different conception of standing than the
critical assessments that have dominated the literature. 13 4 The following analysis, grounded in the theory of social choice, offers a robust
account that reconciles most, if not all, of the claimed inconsistencies
among doctrines and cases, and thus provides a necessary foundation
for the analysis to follow. The description that follows will build upon
the analyses of standing in the prior subparts. That analysis explained
(1) how the ideological divergence between the New Deal Court and
the federal courts of appeals motivated the creation of standing as a
set of default rules, and (2) how the Warren Court's ideological
realignment with the circuit courts and its need for broader judicial
129 See STEARNS, supranote 21, at 33-34 (positing six potential links in the chain of
causation).
130 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965) (providing standing to a
physician, as an accessory in the distribution of contraceptives, to raise patients' privacy claim).

131 Others have noted the analytical relationship between First Amendment chilling and overbreadth doctrines and standing. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REv. 235, 261 (1994).
132 See, e.g., Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 404--09 (1991) (allowing a juror,
excluded on the grounds of race, standing to raise a challenge under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), on behalf of a white criminal defendant); see also Campbell
v. Louisiana, 523 U.S. 392, 398 (1998) (same as applied to the racially motivated
exclusion of a prospective grand jury foreman).
133 For a general discussion, see Maxwell L. Stearns, From Lujan to Laidlaw: A Preliminary Model of Environmental Standing, 11 DuKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 321 (2001).
134 For a discussion of that critical literature, see Stearns, Justiciability, supra note
21, at 1326-27 & n.66.
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access to facilitate a rights-driven jurisprudence motivated a more
relaxed standing doctrine. We will now consider how the loose coalition structures that came to characterize the Burger and Rehnquist
Courts motivated yet another critical transformation in standing doctrine, this time resulting in not merely reestablishing the prudential
limitations of standing, but also in establishing constitutional prerequisites to standing that the Supreme Court eventually imposed even
on Congress itself.
The social choice account not only reconciles seemingly inconsistent doctrine, but also provides standing with an important normative
foundation. This is ultimately rooted in fundamental aspects of separation of powers and thus the legitimacy of the processes through
which constitutional doctrine is created. The analysis reveals that
standing doctrine is conceptually linked to another important doctrine, namely, stare decisis or precedent. While precedent arises at
numerous levels within our pyramidal judicial system, standing doctrine is conceptually linked to horizontal stare decisis, meaning the
Supreme Court's self-imposed presumptive obligation to adhere to its
135
previously announced rulings.
The social choice model of standing explains horizontal stare
decisis as a partial, or presumptive, solution to the potential doctrinal
instability that would otherwise result from a Court whose members'
preferences possess imbedded cycles.1 36 At the same time, it also
identifies an important practical difficulty that arises as a consequence
of using presumptive horizontal stare decisis as a means of stabilizing
doctrine. While stare decisis limits the formalization of cyclical doctrine at least for finite periods and under specified conditions-ones
that find reflection in actual Supreme Court cases 137 -it also has the
potential to ground substantive doctrine in the order in which cases
are presented for review. Case orderings thus affect not only the relative timing of case resolutions, but also, and more problematically, the
substantive doctrine that develops as cases are resolved. With modest
assumptions based upon actual Supreme Court cases, it is possible to
demonstrate that case A followed by case B produces opposite results
from case B followed by case A.
Social choice analysis thus demonstrates that in a presumptive
horizontal stare decisis regime, the substantive evolution of legal doc135 Although stare decisis is not an inexorable command, the Supreme Court presumptively adheres to its own earlier decisions. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v.

Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854-69 (1992) (discussing stare decisis and applying the doctrine
to Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).

136 For a discussion of cycling, see infra note 152.
137

See infra Part I.D.2.

2oo8]

STANDING

AT

THE CROSSROADS

trine is potentially path dependent. Path dependence means that substantive outcomes, here of case law, depend at least in part upon the
order, or path, in which cases are presented and decided. In a precedent-based system, legal doctrine is at least theoretically subject to a
fortuitous determinant, namely, the relative timing of cases, a factor
that has no apparent normative significance to how any particular
legal dispute should be resolved or to the precedent that any given
case should be relied upon to establish.' 3 8 Social choice analysis thus
reveals an inevitable tradeoff confronting any legal system. To
purchase doctrinal stability, a legal system must rely at least presumptively upon precedent. Precedent invites the risk that the fortuity of
path dependence will affect substantive developing legal doctrine. In
contrast, to purchase fully independent resolutions of the merits of
each legal dispute, and thus to avoid any path dependent influence
on developing substantive doctrine, a legal system must reject the presumptive obligation of precedent. In doing so, however, the legal system would invite the risk of a less stable, and thus less reliable,
doctrine.
While path dependence raises a conceptual problem for the
seeming legitimacy of emerging doctrine, a more nuanced social
choice analysis reveals that legitimacy is restored provided that the
critical path of case law is determined by rules grounded in normatively defensible criteria. If indeed there is a pathology that pervades
a precedent-driven legal regime like that in the United States, it is not
the fortuity of grounding substantive outcomes in the order in which
cases happen to be presented. Rather, it is the possibility, or threat,
that the timing of case orderings is the product of deliberate control
rather than of fortuitous events.
Because Supreme Court doctrine is potentially path dependent,
meaning that substantive doctrine is partly a function of the order of
case presentations, interest groups are motivated to manipulate, or
time, case orders in an effort to move substantive doctrine in their
preferred direction. Behaving rationally, such groups will seek to
engage in path manipulation, meaning that they will prefer to order
cases so as to favorably affect and control the ever important decision138

See Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 -ARv. L. REv. 802,

817-21 (1982) (observing the absence of a normative justification for path dependent
influence on developing doctrine). While Judge Easterbrook is certainly correct that

fortuitous timing has no normative connection to the merits of particular legal cases
or precedents, it nonetheless has a strong normative basis in ensuring the processes
through which cases are transformed into precedents are fair. For a more detailed
discussion, see STEARNS, supra note 21, at 63-67 (distinguishing the arbitrariness of
outcomes from the fairness of process through which outcomes are generated).
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making path. If case A followed by case B produces better doctrinal
results than case B followed by case A, an effective interest group will
seek opportunities to present case A first, thus affecting a desired path
of precedent.
In short, precedent produces path dependence and path dependence invites path manipulation. Not surprisingly, the threat of litigant path manipulation invites its own set ofjudicial defense measures
that social choice theory helps to identify. 139 These defenses take the
form of rules setting out criteria that govern the conditions under
which cases can be presented for decision. In this analysis, standing
doctrines can be recast as a set of ground rules through which the
Supreme Court makes it more difficult for ideologically motivated
interest groups to favorably order cases before the lower federal
courts, and ultimately before the Court itself. These rules apply with
particular force when the perceived motivation for case orderings is to
influence developing substantive legal doctrine, rather than to seek
the necessary resolution of a legal dispute into which the litigants have
found themselves unwittingly drawn.
The Supreme Court standing doctrine, as developed in the Burger and Rehnquist Courts, accomplishes this important task by
demanding a set of identifiable preconditions to litigating in federal
court. The constitutional elements of standing require that the claimant suffer: (1) an injury in fact, (2) that the defendant has caused, and
(3) that a court can redress through ordinary judicial relief. 140 In
addition, the Court's prudential standing rules require: (1) that the
alleged injury affect the claimant rather than a third party14 1 and (2)
139 To that extent, the theory of doctrinal evolution grounded in social choice
finds parallels in an influential theory of biological evolution, inspired by the children's classic LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKINc-GLAss AND WHAT ALICE FOUND
THERE (1871).
The Red Queen theory posits that evolutionary developments that
succeed for members of a given species create opportunities for counter-evolutionary
strategies by members of competitor predatory species. See MATT RIDLEY, THE RED
QUEEN 17-18 (1993).
The result is a never ending race that ultimately leaves the
successful members of both species, like Alice and the Red Queen who ran faster and
faster just to keep pace with their surroundings, precisely where their predecessors
had started. See id. at 18 (illustrating with polar bears and arctic seals). It is an
intriguing coincidence that C.L. Dodgson, who used Lewis Carroll as a pen name, was
a professor of mathematics with a particular interest in the discipline that eventually
became known as social choice. See DENNIS MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II, at 3, 84, 159,
170 (2003).
140 See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 753 n.19 (1984) (fair traceability and
causation); id. at 751 (injury).
141 See, e.g., Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012, 1013-17 (1976) (Burger, C.J.,
concurring).
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that the claim be concrete and specific to the individual, rather than
diffuse and general to the public at large. 14 2 These combined constitutional and prudential standing rules increase the probability that
the factual determinants giving rise to the federal court litigation,
which very well might produce a precedent affecting the future path
of constitutional doctrine, are fortuitously determined rather than
deliberately timed and controlled.
The critical insight that emerges from the social choice analysis of
standing, therefore, is that while developing doctrine remains path
dependent as a result of the presumptive adherence to precedent,
with proper standing rules in place, the path itself is more likely to be
determined by fortuitous events beyond any particular litigant's control. As a result, despite the influence of fortuitous timing in affecting
substantive legal doctrine, standing improves the overall fairness, and
thus legitimacy, of the processes through which constitutional doctrine is created. After evaluating two cases from the Burger Court that
illustrate the potential impact of case orderings on substantive doctrinal development, we will reconsider standing doctrine as a means of
limiting the potential threat of interest group path manipulation.
2.

Three Irreconcilable Majorities over Two Cases

The cases of Crawford v. Board of Education143 and Washington v.
Seattle School District No. 1144 both involved efforts to sort the competing concerns over integrating public schools and allowing parents to
elect public neighborhood education for their children, especially in
the lower grades. In both cases, successful initiatives prevented more
local decisionmakers-judges in Crawford and school boards in Seattle
School District-from enacting ambitious integrative policies that went
beyond the limited requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment
Equal Protection Clause, and in Seattle School District, whatever addi45
tional obligations the state constitutional counterpart imposed.
In Crawford, the Court evaluated a California constitutional
amendment that prevented a state court from ordering integrative
busing unless the court first determined that a federal court would so
46
order to remedy a violation of the Federal Equal Protection Clause. 1
142 See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 220-21
(1974).
143 458 U.S. 527 (1982).
144 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
145 The Seattle School District Court also considered whether integrative busing was
necessary to comply with the state's counterpart equal protection requirement. Id. at
476-80.
146
Crawford, 458 U.S. at 529.
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The Crawford Court held that this limitation on busing did not violate
federal equal protection requirements. 47 In Seattle School District, the
Court considered a Washington referendum that prevented a local
school board from ordering integrative busing unless it first determined that the federal or state constitutions so require. 148 The Seattle
School District Court held that the referendum did violate federal equal
protection.

1 49

Justice Marshall, who alone dissented in Crawford, stated that he
believed that the two cases were indistinguishable.1 50 Marshall voted
consistently with this intuition by voting to strike down both challenged laws, thus dissenting in Crawford and joining the majority in
Seattle School District. Justice Powell, who wrote for the Seattle School
District dissent, and who was joined by ChiefJustice Burger, then Associate Justice Rehnquist, and Justice O'Connor, did not expressly state
that the cases were indistinguishable. He did, however, reject those
arguments presented to distinguish the cases. 15 1 Like Marshall, this
group of four Justices voted consistently with the intuition that the
cases were indistinguishable by voting to uphold both challenged laws,
thus dissenting in Seattle School District and forming part of the majority in Crawford. To fully appreciate the anomaly that the Crawford and
Seattle School District cases represent, consider the following lineups
over both cases:
TABLE 1.

CRAWFORD

Majority

Concurrence

Dissent

Powell*
Burger*
Rehnquist*
O'Connor*
Stevens

Brennan
Blackmun

Marshall*

White

147
148
149
150
151

Id. at 540-42.
Seattle Sch. Dist., 458 U.S. at 466.
Id. at 467-70.
Crawford, 458 U.S. at 551-61 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
See Seattle Sch. Dist., 458 U.S. at 495 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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Majority
Blackmun
Marshall*
Brennan
White
Stevens
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SEATTLE SCHOOL DISTRICT

Concurrence

Dissent
Powell*
Burger*
Rehnquist*
O'Connor*

* The asterisks identify those Justices who expressed the view
that the two cases were constitutionally indistinguishable through
their case votes and in the rationales set out the opinions that they
authored or joined.

Setting aside the merits of the two cases, the voting lineup reveals
three overlapping, and ultimately irreconcilable, majorities: (1) a
majority in Seattle School Districtvoting to strike down the challenged
state initiative; (2) a majority in Crawford voting to uphold the
challenged state constitutional amendment; and (3) a majority (those
with asterisks) across Seattle School District and Crawford voting to treat
the two cases consistently, such that either both equal protection
challenges are sustained (per Crawford) or rejected (per Seattle School
District).
Social choice theory demonstrates that unless decisionmakers
permit at least as many binary comparisons as options, it is not
possible to know whether the outcome ultimately chosen is socially
preferred to another based upon the criterion of simple majority rule
over choices presented. 15 2 Limiting comparisons relative to the
number of options creates the risk that the order of choices will
control outcomes. The regime does so by preventing a comparison of
the eventual prevailing option against an option that was defeated in
an earlier round. The result is to produce seeming majority support
152 See, e.g., Arthur Lupia & Mathew D. McCubbins, Lost in Translation: Social
Choice Theory Is Misapplied Against Legislative Intent, 14 J. CoNTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 585,
594-601 (2005);John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine,97 COLUM. L.
REv. 673, 685-86 & n.53 (1997). Consider the following preferences, which cycle
over unlimited binary comparisons: ABC, BCA, CAB. Assuming sincere voting, two
votes over three options could yield any of the three available outcomes, such that A
v. B (A wins) then A v. C (Cwins) yields C; By. C (Bwins) then A v. B (A wins) yields
A; and C v. A (C wins) then B v. C (B wins) yields B. In contrast, by switching the
order of the second and third ordinally ranked preferences for the third listing, from
CAB to CBA, the same exercise demonstrates that B dominates alternatives A and C in
direct binary comparisons by simple majority rule. For a more comprehensive
introduction to the methodology of social choice that illustrates cycling and
noncycling preferences and that evaluates the implications for institutional structure
and reform, see STEARNS, supra note 21, at 41-94.
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for an outcome that a thwarted majority disfavors to an otherwise
available alternative. 153 Not surprisingly, appellate courts, which are
institutionally obligated to resolve those cases properly before them,
have developed mechanisms that prevent indeterminate outcomes. In
groups of cases that threaten cyclical indeterminacy, the most
important such mechanism is presumptive stare decisis or
1

precedent.

54

Limiting the number of binary choices relative to options ensures
an outcome even when none has majority support over all others. In
doing so, the regime gives the appearance, but not necessarily the
actuality, of a meaningful social choice. A common rule that achieves
this objective prevents reconsideration of alternatives defeated in the
past. This rule has the benefit of producing a certain result, but
achieves that result by grounding its selection in the order in which
votes are presented. The presumptive obligation of horizontal stare
decisis is the Supreme Court's version of this time-honored cyclebreaking rule. Not surprisingly, this rule risks grounding doctrine, at
155
least in part, in the order of decisions.
The Seattle School District and Crawford cases illustrate the
problem. Imagine that respect for horizontal precedent was merely
an available argument, rather than a presumptive obligation. As a
theoretical matter, 15 6 the three irreconcilable majorities that cut
153 Thus, in each of the previous examples, a thwarted majority prefers the
outcome defeated in the first round of voting to the outcome selected in the second
round of voting. See supra note 152. Reviving the previously defeated option and
pitting it in a direct comparison against the victor in the second round would reveal a
cycle, such that ApBpCpA, where p means preferred to by simple majority rule.
154 To be clear, the analysis does not suggest that appellate courts, including the
Supreme Court, are obligated to resolve cases in the manner preferred by litigants,
including resolving the merits of presented claims. Rather it suggests that appellate
courts, unlike legislatures, lack the power to remain inert simply because they lack a
majority consensus as to how to resolve a properly docketed case. Even improperly
docketed cases are collectively resolved through various formal dismissal mechanisms.
For a more detailed discussion, see STEARNs, supra note 21, at 65 n.*.
155 See supra notes 152-53 (formal illustration of this rule).
156 Specifically, I am assuming that even without a presumptive obligation to abide
earlier decisions as precedent, treating whichever case was decided first as persuasive
authority is fair game. Certainly this is the manner in which civilian regimes handle
prior cases despite the general understanding that they eschew formal precedent. See
JOHN H. MERRYMAN & ROGEUO PkREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 47 (3d ed.
2007). And certainly earlier cases, like treatises, law review articles, and amicus briefs,
are permissible sources that courts rely upon for their persuasiveness. The difference
between allowing precedent as one of a number of available arguments and a
precedent-based regime is that in the latter, the fact of precedent presumptively binds
a subsequent court without regard to the merits of that earlier resolution.
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across Seattle School District and Crawford would disclose the absence of
a normative justification for preferring one set of potential case
resolutions to another. The resulting threat of indecision would run
afoul of the Supreme Court's institutional obligation to decide the
two cases and to set precedent in a manner that promotes reliance
upon the rule of law. 15 7 While the implicit set of intransitive
preferences can be expressed in various ways, most simply, a
theoretical cycle exists over the three overlapping majorities that
cannot simultaneously be satisfied. 5 8 It is not possible simultaneously
to uphold the challenged amendment in Crawford, to strike down the
challenged referendum in Seattle School District, and to ensure that
Crawford and Seattle School District are resolved in a manner that
satisfies the overlapping majority favoring consistent case treatments.

157 Certainly the Supreme Court did not have an institutional obligation to grant
certiorari in either or both cases and sometimes issues a DIG (dismissal of certiorari as
improvidently granted) to remove cases from its docket. See STEARNs, supra note 21,
at 65 n.*. For an explanation as to why standing and certiorari are both necessary, but
neither sufficient, to minimize the risk of litigant path manipulation in a precedentbased Supreme Court, see id. at 194-97. For our immediate purposes, it is sufficient
to note that once the Court grants certiorari, absent a defect warranting a DIG, the
Court, like all appellate courts lacking discretionary docket control, retains the
institutional obligation to resolve those cases.
158 While this analysis does not suggest that Justices invariably vote sincerely, it
explains how path dependence can be expressed as a cost of insincere voting.
Expressing views in written opinions is potentially costly to jurists who later seek to
avoid being bound by their previously expressed views. The incentive to forge
seemingly problematic distinctions as a means of avoiding the application of
precedent merely underscores the claim that the order in which cases are presented
affects evolving substantive doctrine. This analysis also suggests a complementary
justification for standing, grounded in the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem. This
theorem suggests that, regardless of a preference aggregation rule, there will always
be a potential incentive to present one's preferences insincerely, at least under
specified conditions that correlate to the problem of cycling. See generally NIcotAus
TIDEMAN, COLLEcTIW

DECISIONS AND VOTING

143-48 (2006). Appellate court judges

issue a form of bond, equivalent to published segments of larger ordinal rankings
with respect to various legal policy questions, when they resolve cases through written
opinions. Given the potential incentive to misstate or strategically state preferences
regardless of decisional rule, this theorem supports the intuition that there is a
corresponding judicial incentive to minimize such disclosures unless and until
absolutely necessary. In this account, the standing rules, which increase the
likelihood that fortuitous circumstances rather than careful timing compel the
resolution of a case, might also serve the complementary function of limiting judicial
disclosures of ordinal ranking until the necessary showing to trigger such disclosure
has been demonstrated.
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For any proffered outcome, a simple majority of the Court prefers yet
another.159
Under the Supreme Court's decisionmaking rules, however,
adherence to precedent has been elevated from an available
argument to a presumptive doctrinal obligation.1 60 The regime of
horizontal stare decisis presumptively eliminates one of three possible
theoretical questions that these two cases would have raised had they
been decided sequentially rather than simultaneously, namely, how a
majority would resolve the second case had it been decided as a
matter of first impression and thus without the first case as a
precedent. The resulting regime, which permits only two votes over
the three available issues, produces a stable set of outcomes and
resulting doctrines, but in doing so risks grounding those outcomes
and doctrines in the order in which the two cases are presented.
3.

Standing in the Burger and Rehnquist Courts Revisited

We can now assess the very different function that standing doctrine served in the Burger and Rehnquist Courts as compared with the
functions it served in the New Deal and Warren Courts. Assuming
that the Court is occasionally prone to possessing cyclical preferences,
then the price of a presumptive stare decisis regime is to ground substantive doctrine in the order of case presentations. Although it is
unlikely that interest groups, or Supreme Court Justices for that matter, appreciate the theoretical insights that emerge from social choice,

159 If we assume that the Justices voted sincerely based upon their views on the
merits of the two cases, and if Seattle School District arose first, then after the
Washington State Initiative was struck down, the majority who believed the cases

should be treated alike would have ruled to strike the Crawford amendment as well.
Alternatively, if Crawford arose first, then after the California amendment was upheld,

the majority who believed the cases should be treated alike would have also ruled to
uphold the Seattle School Districtinitiative. Because the two cases were decided at the
same time, with neither a binding precedent on the other, given the Justices'
collective preferences on the individual case dispositions, the cases were decided in
opposite fashion. While any of the three results would have suppressed one of the
three overlapping majorities, in the actual cases, the result was to suppress the
majority who expressed the view that they should have been decided in like manner.
For a more detailed discussion, see STEARNs, supra note 21, at 24-30.
160 For a jointly authored opinion describing the doctrinal obligation of
horizontal stare decisis, see PlannedParenthoodof SoutheasternPennsylvania v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 854-69 (1992) (discussing stare decisis as applied to Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.

113 (1973)).
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they well understand the practical significance of case orderings.' 61
Interest groups have a strong incentive to time cases for maximum
effect. A rational Supreme Court will seek to minimize the perception
that the timing of doctrine, which affects its evolving substantive content, is being manipulated and controlled, and will do so by developing mechanisms that ground case timing in random historical
developments. 62 The various standing rules that the Burger and
Rehnquist Courts developed readily translate into a set of constraints
that improve the probability that random events, rather than advertent path manipulation, are the primary determinants of the inevitable path creating law within our precedent-based regime.
This is perhaps best expressed by considering the most obvious
techniques that ideologically motivated litigants, or interest groups,
could employ if they possessed an unfettered ability to time cases for
maximal doctrinal effect. To fully appreciate the role of standing, it
will now be helpful to place it in a broader context of timing-based
justiciability doctrines that includes ripeness and mootness. 163 These
relatively blunt barriers to justiciability prevent claims based upon fact
patterns that are hypothetical or in some sense not adequately devel64
oped (ripeness), and claims that are no longer live (mootness).1
With no barriers to litigating cases that are not ripe or that are moot,
litigants could construct hypothetical facts or resurrect facts from past
cases, and in so doing, place laws they seek to challenge in their most
doctrinally problematical light. Ripeness and mootness doctrines thus
establish important first level barriers to path manipulation. At the
161

See, e.g.,

STEARNS,

supra note 21, at 181-90 (discussing the role of case order-

ings in the development of equal protection doctrine affecting gerrymandering, racial
desegregation, and sex-based distinctions).
162 As we shall see, however, rules targeted against path manipulation will not prevent ideologically devoted litigants from seeking redress in the federal courts when
those litigants satisfy standing requirements. Thus, for example, Jennifer Gratz, who
successfully challenged the University of Michigan undergraduate affirmative action
program before the Supreme Court, see Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 175-76
(2003), has since become active in fighting affirmative action more generally. See
Peter Slevin, Court Battle Likely on Affirmative Action, WASH. POST, Nov. 18, 2006, at A2
('Jennifer Gratz, who earned headlines for suing the University of Michigan over
admissions policy in a case decided by the Supreme Court in 2003, returned home to
lead the fight [for Proposition 2, which ended race-based affirmative action in Michigan], backed by Ward Connerly, who bankrolled similar battles in California and
Washington.").
163 For a more detailed social choice analysis of ripeness and mootness doctrines
as they relate to standing, see STEARNS, supra note 21, at 251-56.
164 See, e.g., Nat'l Park Hospitality Ass'n v. Dep't of the Interior, 538 U.S. 803,
807-08 (2003) (ripeness); City News & Novelty, Inc. v. City of Waukesha, 531 U.S.
278, 283-86 (2001) (mootness).
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same time, however, these doctrines leave open other channels that
motivate a set ofjusticiability barriers concerning presently live claims,
meaning claims that are ripe and not moot. While even the more
nuanced standing doctrines remain imperfect barriers to path manipulation, the social choice account explains their emergence as a
rational response to identifiable pressures on the Burger and Rehnquist Courts.

165

Absent any restrictions, interest groups seeking, for example, to
secure the maximum constitutional protections for the criminally
accused could scan records of cases producing criminal convictions in
search of the most favorable facts that could be used to test the limits
of the relevant constitutional protections. As favorable precedents are
established, the same litigants could then work toward bringing
increasingly challenging facts within the scope of newly established
constitutional protections. The simple prudential prohibition-no
right to enforce the rights of others 166-imposes an important first
step that limits this obvious technique for path manipulation. At the
same time, however, this prudential standing rule encourages repackaging of substantive claims into an alternative justiciable form. Without regard to how the claim affects the actual convicted criminal, a
litigant can claim that she is personally harmed by simply knowing
that a member of society has been convicted and sentenced in violation of his or her federal constitutional rights. Unless the litigant is
lying, the claim has transformed what had been a third party claim
into a first party claim, 167 albeit one that can also be used to further
the objectives of litigant path manipulation.
These prudential standing rules-no right to enforce the rights
of others and no right to raise diffuse harm claims 6 8-combine to
impose significant barriers to the most obvious possibilities for
manipulating the relative timing of presently live claims. In addition,
these two prudential standing rules, and one other discussed below, 169
are significantly bolstered by the three constitutional prerequisites to
165 Of course, the relevant question is not whether the doctrines are perfect, but
rather whether they are better than available alternatives in reducing path manipulation. See Maxwell L. Stearns, The Misguided Renaissance of Social Choice, 103 YALE L.J.
1219, 1230 n.33 (1994) (discussing the importance of avoiding the nirvana fallacy in
social choice analysis).
166 See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
167 See Fletcher, supra note 65, at 290-91 (observing that unless one takes the view
that claimants are lying about their claimed injuries, standing determinations are necessarily substantive conclusions about what can or cannot be litigated).
168
169

See supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 175-81 and accompanying text.
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standing. The constitutional elements of standing, drawn from a
prima facie tort action,1 70 further increase the likelihood that a proffered claim is motivated by the desire to seek meaningful redress for
injury, in spite of (rather than because of) the potential that the case
itself might prove a useful vehicle for developing preferred substantive constitutional doctrine. By demanding "injury in fact," "causation," and "redressability," standing doctrine seeks a set of factors that
correlate to traditional bipolar litigation. 7 1 The presumption is that
such suits are motivated by factual events that have arisen due to circumstances beyond the claimant's control, have inflicted real harm,
and are susceptible to meaningful judicial redress. 172 This is not to
suggest that litigants capable of satisfying these criteria are immune
from any concerns of an ideological motivation. 173 Rather, these presumptive and constitutional criteria generally signal a reduced
probability that the primary motivation underlying the suit is to make
law rather than to obtain relief.
As stated above, even this complex set of nuanced standing rules
leaves open one important and subtle potential vehicle for litigant
path manipulation that helps explain a remaining prudential standing
barrier. We can now recast problematic cases such as Allen and Bakke,
which are particularly important in assessing political accounts of
standing doctrines. The two cases are notable in that neither involved
a third party injury or a legally diffuse claim. The Allen claimants, or
their children, suffered the claimed injury. 174 Despite the size of the
75
group, their claim distinguished them from the population at large.1
In addition, both sets of claimants sought relief for their own claimed

170

See STEARNS, supra note 21, at 269-71.
171 See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
172 Criminal defendants are paradigmatic bipolar litigants, at least assuming that
they have generally committed the underlying offenses for which they are charged.
While they create the factual predicates to their arrests and trials, except in rare cases
they do not engage in the underlying criminal activity for purposes of developing
precedent, but rather to obtain a benefit with the hope of evading the legal system.
Once in the system, however, they are motivated to secure relief, rather than to produce favorable law benefiting criminal defendants generally. See STEARNS, supra note
21, at 163-64 (relating criminal procedure cases to standing doctrine).
173 See supra note 162. Moreover, there remains one important category-no right
to an unregulated market-in which all other criteria are met, and yet the Court has
found such claims nonjusticiable. See infra notes 178-79 and accompanying text.
174 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 739-40 (1984).
175 For a case distinguishing group size from the question of whether a claim is
legally diffuse, see FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 22-23 (1998) (observing that not all
injuries that are widely shared are abstract and thus legally diffuse).
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injuries, rather than for those of another interested party. And yet,
1 77
1 76
the Court granted standing in Bakke but denied it in Allen.
These two cases have been criticized because, as previously
shown, the opportunity injury analysis from Bakke would have resulted
in granting the Allen claimants standing, while the causal chain analysis from Allen would have resulted in denying Bakke standing. 178 The
anomaly disappears, however, once we recognize that although the
two cases fall within the same analytical category-a claimed right to
an undistorted market-they rest on different points along an important analytical spectrum.
If cases that test the presumptive barriers against third party
standing and diffuse harm standing rest at the end of the standing
spectrum in which path manipulation is presumed, traditional bipolar
litigation rests at the opposite end in which claims for relief, rather
than the desire to make law, are presumed. The Allen and Bakke cases
are analytically difficult because they rest in the middle of this analytical spectrum. 179 These cases possess features that suggest the possibility of path manipulation on the one hand and the desire for judicial
relief specific to their claim on the other. It is important to emphasize
that this analysis suggests nothing about the merits of either case, but
rather, focuses on the relationship between the nature of the litigants
and the characteristics of the claims that they are pursuing.
While the Bakke precedent lasted a full generation and has since
spawned two majority decisions reaffirming the split Bakke resultallowing the affirmative use of race to promote the compelling interest in diversity in higher education but disallowing the use of racial
quotas-for a self-proclaimed twenty-five year period,1 80 it remains
important to distinguish Bakke from Bakke, the litigant from the case.
Bakke possessed all the requisite characteristics of an individual claiming a violation of constitutional law that caused him an identifiable,
specific, and concrete harm. Mr. Bakke wanted to become Dr. Bakke,
and a particular medical school's racial set-aside policy, which he
176 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 281 n.14 (1978) (opinion
of Powell, J.).
177 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 754 (1984).
178 See supra notes 119-29 and accompanying text.
179 For a more detailed discussion, including graphical depictions, see STEARNS,
supra note 21, at 271-81.
180 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) ("It has been 25 years since
Justice Powell first approved the use of race to further an interest in student body
diversity in the context of public higher education.... We expect that 25 years from
now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest
approved today."); see also Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 275-76 (2003) (striking
down the University of Michigan undergraduate affirmative action program).
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alleged violated equal protection, appeared to obstruct his path. In
contrast, the Allen claimants, who pressed a claim that rested at the
core of race-based equal protection doctrine, one dating to Brown v.
Board of Education,1" presented a set of case facts with features that
pulled toward the opposite end of the spectrum, thus favoring a presumption of path manipulation. The case would not result in an obvious identifiable benefit to the claimants' children or necessarily alter
the claimed racist policies in the private schools whose conduct was
implicated in the litigation. If the claimants succeeded, however, it
was clear that the result would be to effect a change in a legal policy
with obvious nationwide consequences.
The social choice analysis demonstrates that while these cases are
not different in kind, they are notably different in degree. The Bakke
facts effectively pulled the Court's intuitions toward inferring that
Bakke's overriding purpose was to secure relief in spite of any precedent, however important, the case might produce. In contrast, the
Allen facts effectively pulled the Court's intuitions in the direction of
inferring an overriding motivation to create a favorable precedent,
again however important, when the case itself was likely to have little if
any discernible effect in remedying concrete harm to claimants, their
children, or the relevant institutions in their communities.
The analysis thus far provides the theoretical underpinnings that
explain the transformation of standing doctrine from its inception in
the New Deal into its present form as developed in the Burger and
Rehnquist Courts. For the social choice model to explain this important historical transformation of standing doctrine, identifiable characteristics in those later Courts must have rendered them specially
prone to the possibility of path manipulation. The next section identifies those features that motivated this doctrinal transformation. The
Part that follows then evaluates this summary of the Supreme Court's
timing-based justiciability barriers against two new sets of combined
data and then explores the implications for the political economy of
the Roberts Court.
4.

The Burger and Rehnquist Courts in Social Choice Perspective

In important individual cases and groups of cases over time, the
Burger and Rehnquist Courts were prone to issuing opinions that
masked underlying cyclical preferences. This phenomenon was not
limited to pairings or groups of cases. Even within individual cases,
this occurred when separate majority resolutions of those issues that
181

347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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the Justices explicitly or implicitly agreed with led to one result were
8 2
thwarted by a contrary majority resolution for the case as a whole.'
As seen in the preceding discussion of Seattle School District and Crawford, this also occurred when the resolutions of more than one case
thwarted the preferences of one of several overlapping majorities con183
cerning a specific case outcome as a result of horizontal precedent.
While such anomalies certainly arose in earlier periods, 184 the question is why such results became more notable in the Burger and Rehnquist Courts.
The analysis reveals, and the data developed in the next Part support the intuition, that these Courts were unusual in a particular
respect. Specifically, they possessed no fewer than three persistent yet
nondominantjurisprudential camps. As a result of this phenomenon,
in significant individual cases and groups of cases over time, these
Courts were prone to issuing results that masked internal cycling or
that manifested path dependence. This tendency toward outcomes
that reflected sometimes unstable underlying group preferences was
primarily attributable to the peculiar historical circumstances of the
Burger Court and had lingering effects throughout the Rehnquist
Court period. Only now in the emerging Roberts Court does it
appear plausible that with at least one more conservative judicial
replacement, the Supreme Court's risk of producing such results in
important cases will be substantially reduced. Combined with the mission to move doctrine in a more conservative direction with the help
of the aligned lower federal judiciary, this will place stress on existing
strict standing rules.
While the Nixon appointees, who ultimately gave rise to the Burger Court, cut into the Warren Court's dominant liberal bloc, they
failed to supersede that bloc with a controlling bloc of core conservatives. Instead, the Burger Court, and ultimately the Rehnquist Court
as well, was characterized by three persistent but nondominant camps,
whose jurisprudence tended to operate in fits and starts. The camps
included holdovers from the liberal Warren Court era, new appointees who hoped to retrench on landmark Warren Court precedents to
restore the Supreme Court to a more modest judicial role, and an
emerging centrist bloc who rejected the dominant ideologies of the
left and right in favor of a more balanced, procedurally oriented, case182

See STEARs, supra note 21, at 97-156 (collecting individual cases); id. at

157-211 (collecting groups of cases).
183 See supra Part I.D.2.
184 See, e.g., Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582 (1949).
For a social choice analysis of Tidewater, see STEARNs, supra note 21, at 111-17.
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by-case approach. This bloc sought to combine a generally conservative understanding respecting newly claimed rights with a respect for
precedent and the processes through which those precedents were
developed.

18

5

The principal difficulty that confronted the Burger Court conservatives was not the continuing liberal coalition. Any transitional
Supreme Court will include some holdovers who predictably dissent
from opinions that signal the Court is moving in a substantially new
doctrinal direction. Instead, the problem came from a split that
emerged within the emerging conservative bloc itself. This split was
primarily attributable to the defining characteristics of the Warren
Court's rights-based liberalism, in contrast with the progressive liberalism of the earlier New Deal era.
The Warren Court relied upon a liberal understanding of the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, in combination with
incorporated provisions from the Bill of Rights, to broadly expand
individual rights in such areas as voting, free expression, privacy, and
constitutional criminal procedure. For the Burger Court to retrench
upon such landmark precedents as Miranda v. Arizona,18 6 Mapp v.
Ohio,187 and New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,'8 8 to name only a few,
required a two-part determination. First, the Court had to determine
that the original case was wrongly decided, and second, it had to
determine that even if wrongly decided, the case should not be
retained as a matter of horizontal precedent. The difficulty that gave
rise to loose coalition structures in the Burger and Rehnquist Courts
was that ultimately the growing conservative bloc split between core
conservatives, those willing to reevaluate and to overrule disfavored
liberal precedents, and moderate conservatives, those disinclined to
expand upon existing liberal rulings, but also reluctant to discard
precedents that they might not have supported as an initial matter. 18 9
The emergence of a procedurally oriented, moderate conservative bloc complicated the perceived doctrinal mission of the Burger
Court by rendering outcomes of contentious cases substantially less
predictable. To be sure, even when the Court failed to produce a
185 For a detailed analysis, see STEARNS, supra note 21, at 215-49.
186 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
187 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
188 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
189 Consider, for example, San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1 (1973), in which Justice Powell, writing for a majority, declined to find the
Texas public school funding scheme a violation of equal protection, but in doing so
signaled no retreat from those cases that had already used equal protection to
announce judicially identified fundamental rights. Id. at 28-36.
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majority ruling, the centrist bloc itself most often formed its own stable center of gravity over the resulting fractured sets of opinions. This
result was certainly reinforced by the narrowest grounds rule. 190 It
might be no coincidence that Marks v. United States,19 1 the opinion
reifying the narrowest grounds rule, was authored by none other than
Lewis Powell, the often pivotal moderate conservative who just one
year later produced the still-adhered-to formula in Bakke governing
race conscious affirmative action programs in higher education, and
who did so in an opinion the critical parts of which no other Justice
joined.1 9 2 The narrowest grounds doctrine later empowered another
group that included moderate conservatives-Associate Justices
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter-to rearticulate, while not overturning, the doctrine of Roe v. Wade,193 in the landmark challenge Planned
Parenthoodof SoutheasternPennsylvania v. Casey. 19 4 In doing so, this coalition thwarted the wishes of the Court's liberal members who preferred the stricter trimester formulation that Roe established,1 95 and of
the Court's conservative members who would have preferred to over196
rule Roe outright.

Certainly it is possible to hypothesize cases in which the liberal
and core conservative blocs would prefer to reach the merits without
regard to centrist concerns over procedural technicalities or adherence to precedent. They might do so because the strategy is a worthwhile risk in an effort to effectuate their preferred doctrinal result in
the particular case, or because signaling relaxed precedent is valuable
for future cases with greater prospects for success on the merits. 197
The larger point, however, is that a Court characterized by three
persistent yet nondominant ideologies is more likely to generate a
variety of substantive doctrinal approaches to important legal
problems, with the effect of increasing the likelihood of masked
intransitive preferences. Moderate conservatives almost by definition
190 For a general discussion, see Maxwell L. Stearns, The Casefor Including Marks v.
United States in the Canon of Constitutional Law, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 321, 335-38

(2000).
191 430 U.S. 188 (1977).
192 See Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 123, at 961-73.
193 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
194 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
195 See id. at 929 (Blackmun,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (expressing continued support for the original Roe formulation).
196 See id. at 944 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("We
believe that Roe was wrongly decided, and that it can and should be overruled consistenfly with our traditional approach to stare decisis in constitutional cases.").
197 For several possible iterations taking this form that can produce a theoretical
cycle, see STEARNs, supra note 21, at 239-44.
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form more frequent coalitions with members of both the liberal and
conservative blocs than other members of the Court. This tendency
to switch off in forging particular case coalitions encourages moderates to develop innovative alternative doctrinal approaches that reconcile existing precedents with a more conservative development of
future doctrine. Such an approach thus encourages a proliferation of
doctrinal frameworks both within individual cases and over larger
groups of cases. By increasing the number of analytical options available, these Justices also increase the likelihood that in selecting among
options, the Justices will disclose majorities that prefer alternatives to
existing doctrinal outcomes. A core insight of social choice is that the
probability of cyclical group preferences increases with an increase in
the number of options presented.19 8 The proliferation of emerging
doctrinal approaches, whether involving matters ofjurisdiction, 199 the
dormant Commerce Clause, 20 0 or equal protection, 20 1 has generated
opinions in individual cases or groups of cases over time that, absent
rules limiting disclosure of intransitive preferences, would expose
20 2
embedded doctrinal cycles.
The combined effect on the Burger and Rehnquist Courts was to
render case outcomes and developing doctrines less predictable and,
as a result of precedent, more dependent on such fortuitous matters
as timing. As stated previously, fortuity is not itself normatively problematical provided that the system does not invite systematic manipulation that undermines the perception of fairness respecting the
eventual case outcomes. 20 3 Given the possibility that path manipulation would play a greater role in affecting developing doctrine, the
Burger and Rehnquist Courts were ripe for transforming standing
doctrine from its New Deal roots into an alternative form. These
Courts redeployed standing as a doctrinal barrier that made it more
difficult for ideologically motivated interest groups to benefit from
the possibility of path manipulation.
As previously mentioned, the social choice account places the
modern standing doctrine in its proper historical context and

198 See STEVENJ. BRAMs, PARADOXES IN POLITICS 41-43 (1976); Michael I. Meyerson, The IrrationalSupreme Court, 84 NEB. L. REv. 895, 905 n.36 (2006).
199 See Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 603 (1949).
200 See Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 669 (1981).
201 See Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 433 (1998).
202 For a discussion of embedded cycles in each of these cases, see STEARNS, supra
note 21, at 99-102, 107-09, 111-17 (discussing, respectively, Tidewater, Kassel, and
Miller).
203 See supra Part II.C.1.
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explains why the doctrine assumed its present form. 2 0 4 This analysis is
but the first of two steps, however, in assessing the likely motivations of
the Roberts Court with respect to standing and in assessing the
broader impact on that Court of any resulting change in standing doctrine. To fully appreciate the political economy of the Roberts Court,
it is important to now place the social choice account of the evolution
of standing doctrine within the context of the broader historical perspective on the Supreme Court. The next Part provides the data for
evaluating this relationship along this timeline from the New Deal to
the Roberts Court.
II.

THE STANDING TIMELINE FROM THE NEW

DEAL

COURT

TO THE ROBERTS COURT

A.

Introduction

The preceding analysis suggests that the Court is motivated to
strengthen standing in two sets of circumstances: first when there has
been a divergence between the ideological dominance of the
Supreme Court and that of the federal courts of appeals (the New
Deal standing story); and second, when the Supreme Court itself has
been prone to a set of loose coalition structures that has invited the
risk of litigant path manipulation (the Burger and Rehnquist Courts
standing story). Together, these stories might imply that, absent an
ideological divergence or a loose coalition structure within the Court
itself, the Court will necessarily seek to relax standing. This is only
likely to occur, however, when the existing standing rules undermine
the perceived doctrinal mandate of the emerging bloc within the
Supreme Court.
To evaluate the preceding analysis of the Supreme Court, we
need to combine two sets of data: first, data on the nature of the
Supreme Court's internal coalitions; and second, data on the relationship between the dominant ideology of the Supreme Court and that
of the federal courts of appeals. The next subpart combines two sets
of data in a chronological sequence that allows for such an assessment
for the full period in which the Supreme Court has used standing to
further its doctrinal agenda. These data further allow a proper historical assessment of the emerging Roberts Court.
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See supra Part I.D.1.
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Description and Presentation of Data

This subpart will track the history of the Supreme Court and its
relationship to the federal courts of appeals based upon two sets of
combined data. For most of the years listed, 1933 through 2006,
Table 3 provides the following data: the President; the Chief Justice;
the Supreme Court balance, including designations of liberal (italicized), moderate (normal typeface), and conservative (bold); and the
number of federal circuit courts with majorities that are controlled by
judges appointed by Democratic Presidents, Republican Presidents, or
tied. For each year, the table first lists the number of circuits controlled by judges appointed by Democratic or Republican Presidents,
or in which there is a tie, first based upon those judges on active status, and then in brackets including those on senior status.
Three appendices appear at the end of this Article: first, a table
with additional background data informing the Supreme Court data;
second, an explanation of the methodology used to generate the circuit court data; and third, additional data informing the circuit court
data. Before proceeding, a brief summary will be helpful. The data
on the circuit courtjudges is taken from the Federal Judges Biographical Database, compiled by the Federal Judicial Center.2 0 5 The numbers are as of January 1 for each stated year, on the assumption that
any new confirmations will have been completed by that date for a
given circuit court term. Because of the specific subject matter governing its docket, and thus its reduced impact in affecting the motivation for the Supreme Court's timing-based justiciability rules, these
data do not include the Federal Circuit.
With respect to the circuit courts, there is an important limitation
to relying upon the party of the appointing President as a means of
signaling ideological direction. It is well known that up until the Reagan administration, Southern Democrats included many conservatives, some of whom later joined the Republican party and others of
whom remained Democrats even though their general ideological
views were no longer in the mainstream of the Democratic party or its
leadership. 20 6 In addition, the appointments process for federal
judges often includes deference to the recommendations by senators
205

Federal Judges Biographical Database, http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf

(follow "Judges of the United States Courts" hyperlink; then follow "The Federal
Judges Biographical Database" hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 27, 2008). The specific
search criteria used are listed in Appendix B.
206 See Frank Upham, The Role of Lawyers in Social Change: United States, 25 CASE W.
RES. J. INT'L L. 147, 150 (1993) (discussing the historical role of conservative Southern Democrats in the Senate in blocking liberal judicial appointments).
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from the state in which the judge is expected to be seated. 207 It is not
surprising, therefore, that within particular historical periods, certain
circuits developed more liberal or more conservative reputations,
largely as a result of the influence of the senators from the states in
which the circuit sits, and thus to some extent despite the party of the
appointing President. While these remain important concerns, to a
substantial extent anomalous appointments can be expected to cancel
each other out. Given the large numbers involved, such aberrations
are not likely to fundamentally call into question the strong trends
that these data reveal.
The data for the Supreme Court itself is taken and adapted from
a database developed by two political scientists, Andrew Martin and
Kevin Quinn. 20 8 The Martin-Quinn database is designed to identify
the median Justice on each Supreme Court, by year, based upon a
statistical method used to generate an ideal point for each Justice relative to the Court on which he or she sits. 2 0 9 While the methodological
details are inessential to this Article's analysis, it is important to note
that the statistical method, which relies upon Bayesian analysis, allows
the authors to identify an ideal point for each Justice and to determine if that ideal point changes from year to year-or, in their language, if the ideal point "drifts"-during each Justice's tenure on the
Court. 21 0 This methodology has allowed Martin and Quinn to generate numerical data that proves particularly helpful for this Article.
The analysis demonstrates that Justices can drift in consequence of
their own changing ideological predilections over time (for example
Justice Blackmun's drift from moderate conservative to liberal), 2 11 or
in consequence of a change in the nature or ideological content of
207 See Carl Tobias, RethinkingFederalJudicialSelection, 1993 BYU L. REV. 1257, 1266
(discussing the Reagan administration's policy of deference to home senators injudicial selections).
208 The authors' methodology, analysis, and results are presented in two major
papers: Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimationvia Markov
Chain Monte Carlofor the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953-1999, 10 PoL. AN'AMvsls 134, 137-45
(2002) (model); id. at 145-51 (results); id. at 152 (analysis); Martin et al., supra note
9, at 1296-304, 1307-15. In addition, they offer an explanation with helpful links,
including the backup data for Appendix A and a Quicktime movie displaying the data
from 1937 to 2005, at http://mqscores.wustl.edu (last visited Jan. 27, 2008).
209 Martin & Quinn, supra note 208, at 134.
210 For a more detailed description of the methodology, see id. at 134-37, 148
(setting out the methodology and illustrating drift).
211 See infra Appendix A, column 3, years 1970-93 (demonstrating that Blackmun
scored a conservative high value of 1.858 in 1970 and a liberal low value of -1.812 in
1993, with 1976-84 showing moderate scores based upon the scoring system
described in the text).
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the cases presented to the Court (for example, Justice Frankfurter's
drift from liberal to conservative) 212
As with the circuit court data, a few limitations emerge from the
Martin-Quinn scores. The scoring system operates with positive and
negative numbers out to three decimal places with positive scores signaling degrees of conservatism and negative scores signaling degrees
of liberalism. 2 13 This Article's analysis requires not merely a binary
designation of liberal or conservative but rather a three-part division
that also includes moderates. There is no uniform number that
emerges from the Martin-Quinn scoring system that identifies moderates as such. Ideally, moderates would operate within one standard
deviation of the overall point system that the scoring system entails,
liberals would be further than a standard deviation to one side, and
conservatives further than a standard deviation to the opposite side.
Although substantially more nuanced than other systems that merely
rank liberal or conservative, the Martin-Quinn scoring system was not
developed to facilitate rankings over three general categories: conservative, moderate, and liberal. The numbers are intended primarily
to convey ordinal relationships among the Justices and to locate the
ideal points of individual Justices in specific terms, which the data
demonstrate change over time, rather than relational assessments
against some identified mean for the Supreme Court as a whole.
To devise a system for the necessary three-part division of liberal,
moderate, and conservative, the following Table employs a proxy for
standard deviation that is based upon an overall assessment of the
relational scoring system. Most scores fall between -2.25 and 0 for liberals and between 0 and 2.25 for conservatives, although there are
outliers on both ends. The overall point range, therefore, for most
jurists is 4.5. This Article employs a point range that gives liberals,
moderates, and conservatives a 1.5 distance within that range, but
retains liberal and conservative status for more extreme positions at
either end. Within this range, moderates score -0.75 to 0.75, liberals
score anything lower than -0.75, and conservatives score anything
above 0.75.
It is important to emphasize that the purpose of developing this
scoring system is not statistical precision. Rather it is to allow a mean212 See infra Appendix A, column 3, years 1939-61 (demonstrating that Frankfurter scored a liberal low value of -1.187 in 1939 and a conservative high value of
1.798 in 1961, with numerous interspersed moderate years, but generally remaining
conservative since 1956).
213 See Martin & Quinn, supra note 208, at 145-47. Appendix A employs the Post
Mean variable from the resulting data, which the authors have used to inform their
sequential models. See id. at 148 fig.1.
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ingful and rigorous check against potentially simplistic characterizations that rest upon such intuitions as viewing the New Deal and
Warren Courts as liberal and the Burger and Rehnquist Courts as conservative. The net effect is a set of categorizations for the Court as a
whole that reflects common characterizations in the legal literature
and in the popular media respecting the individual Justices, and that
appear intuitive based on widely shared ideological conceptions
among students of the Court. 2 14 In addition, when these data are

used to determine trends concerning the ideological centers of gravity
on the Supreme Court that are persistent over relatively longer periods of time, the scores provide the basis for meaningful comparisons
with the data on the ideological centers of gravity, based upon the
party of the appointing President, for the majority of the federal
courts of appeals.

214 The results are not always immediately intuitive forJustices on Courts during
prior periods, thus inviting the need for clarification where divergences arise. And
yet, as seen in Part I.D, the newly developed point scoring system does quite well with
notable appointees to the Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist Courts. See supra notes
96-111 and accompanying text.
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SUPREME COURT/CIRCUIT COURT ALIGNMENTS
(ACTIVE, [ToTA])

Year
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937*
1938*
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961*
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968

President
FDR

Chief
Justice

Truman
Vinson

Kennedy
LBJ

Circuit Court Balance
Dem.
Rep.
Tied

3/4
4/5
6
3
3
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
3
2
2

9 [8]
8 [8]
8 [7]
7 [7]
7 [6]
5 [4]
4 [5]
3 [4]
3 [3]
3 [3]
2 [2]
2 [2]
2 [2]
2 [2]
2 (2]
2 [2]
2 [2]
2 (2]
2 [2]

1 [2]
2 [2]
1 [2]
2 [2]
2 [3]
0 [2]
1 [1]
1 [1]
0 [1]
0 [0]
1 [1]
0 [0]
0 [0]
0 [0]
0 [0]
0 [0]
0 [0]
0 [0]
0 [0]

3
3/2
1
3
5
4
4
4
5
3
2
4
1
1
3

3/2
2
2
3
1
1
1
1
0
2
3
1
6
6
4

1 [1]
1 [1]
1 [1]
2 (2]
2 [2]
6 [5]
6 [5]
7 [6]
8 [7]
8 [8]
8 (8]
9 [9]
9 [91
9 [9]
9 [9]
9 [9]
9 [9]
9 [9]
9 [9]

2

1

6

9 [9]

1 [2]

1 [0]

2
2
3
3
3
3
4
4
3
5
5
3
4
4
5
5

3
3
2
2
2
2
2
1
3/4
3
2
5
3
3
3
3

3
3
4
4
4
4
3
4
3/2
1
1
1
2
2
1
1

9 [9]
10 [9]
9 [9]
7 [7]
6 [7]
5 [7]
5 [6]
5 [5]
4 [4]
4 [5]
4 [4]
4 [5]
3 [5]
6 [7]
7 [9]
8 [9]

1
1
2
2
4
5
6
6
6
6
7
6
6
5
2
2

1 [0]
0 [0]
0 [0]
2 [1]
1 [0]
1 [1]
0([0]
0 (0]
1 [1]
1 [2]
0 [1]
1 [1]
2 [3]
0 [1]
2 (0]
1 [0]

Hughes
(since 1930)

Stone

Eisenhower

S. Ct. Balance
mod. con.

lib.

Warren

[2]
[2]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[3]
[5]
[6]
[6]
[4]
[6]
[5]
[3]
[3]
[2]
[2]

NOTRE

Year

President

Chief
justice

DAME

LAW

REVIEW
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Circuit Court Balance
Tied
Dem. 11Rep.

111]
1(0]
9[10]
6
1
1
Burger
Nixon
1969**
0 [0]
2 [2]
2
9 [9]
4
3
1970
1 [1]
9 [8]
1 (2]
1
5
3
1971
0 [1
4 [3]
5
7 [7]
3
1
1972
0 [3]
6 [4]
5 [4]
4
3
2
1973
0 [3]
5 [4]
4
6 [4]
3
2
Ford
1974
0 (3]
6 [4]
4
5 [4]
2
3
1975
6 [6]
1 [1]
4 [4]
5
2
2
1976
2 [1]
2
[3]
7
[7]
2
2
5
Carter
1977
1 [1]
6 [5]
5 [5]
4
3
2
1978
0 [2]
6 [4]
3
5 [5]
2
4
1979
3 [2]
0 [2]
3
8 [7]
2
4
1980***
1 [1]
2 [21
4
8 [8]
3
Reagan
2
1981***
0 [1]
9 [8]
3 [3]
3
4
2
1982****
3 [3]
1 [1]
8 [8]
3
4
2
1983
1 [0]
8 [9]
3 [3]
4
2
3
1984
1985
15 [5] 15 [6] 12 [1]
3
1
5
Rehnquist
1 3
1986
4
14 [2] 18 8] 1 0 [2]
L
9 [10]
3 [2]
0 [0]
1
5
3
1987
2 [0
0 [1]
10 [11]
5
3
1
1988
1 [1]
0 [0]
11 [11]
0
5
4
1989
Bush I
1 [1]
11 [11]
5
0 [0]
3
1
1990
11 (12]
1 [0]
3
0 [0]
2
4
1991
1 [0]
11 [12]
4
0 [0]
3
2
1992
0 [0]
0 [0]
12 [12]
3
4
2
1993
Clinton
12 (12]
0 [0]
0 [0]
5
3
1
1994
12 [12]
0 [0]
3
0 [0]
1
5
1995
1 [0]
11 [12]
4
0 [0]
2
3
1996
10 [12]
1 [0]
4
1 [0]
4
1
1997
10 12]
0 [0]
2 [0]
3
2
4
1998
0 [1]
3 [2]
9 [9]
4
4
1
1999
[9]
1 [0]
3
[3]
9
1
4
4
2000
2 (0]
7 [10]
4
3 [2]
4
1
Bush II
2001
6 [10]
2 (0]
4 [2]
1
4
4
2002
2 [0]
7 [11]
3
3 [1]
2
4
2003
1 [0]
2 [1]
9 [11]
2
3
4
2004
1 [0]
9 [11]
4
2 [1]
Roberts
4
1
2005
1 foi
2 [11
9 ri1
2006
* Indicates transitional year in which outgoing (first listing) and incoming (second listing) judicial
scores are reported.
** Indicates a year in which the Supreme Court had fewer than nine Justices as a result of Justice
Goldberg's retirement and the delayed replacement with Justice Blackmun.
*** In 1980 and 1981, appointees were credited to the Fifth Circuit in anticipation of the 1982 split
of that circuit into two circuits, the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits. The first year listed for the Eleventh
Circuit is 1982.
**** Beginning this year, as a result of the newly created and staffed Eleventh Circuit, the circuits
now total twelve, rather than the previous eleven.
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Analysis of Data

While combined within a single table, the data presented in
Table 3 are extensive. They track the ideological dominance of the
federal courts of appeals from 1933 through 2006 and the ideological
balance and dominance in the Supreme Court from 1937 through
2005. In addition, the Table affords the basis for ready comparison
between the Supreme Court and the circuit courts for the entire
period of overlap, 1937 through 2005.215
In the remainder of this Part, I will review the major junctures in
this Table and relate them to the theory of standing set out in the
prior part. To do so, I need to make a few general observations about
the results. The characterizations liberal, moderate, and conservative
(represented in the Table with fonts liberal, moderate, conservative)
are artificial constructions. They are intended to capture the tendency ofjurists to cast votes and to issue opinions for which particular
values can be assigned using a uniform scale of measurement along a
single normative liberal-to-conservative spectrum. One could avoid
the need for gross categorizations of this sort by instead reporting the
actual positive (conservative) or negative (liberal) scores that the Martin-Quinn index reports, which are presented along with a continuous
Supreme Court timeline from 1937 to present in Appendix A. This
alternative presentation, however, would undermine the ability to test
the social choice analysis of standing, which requires an assessment of
whether for any given period the Supreme Court is generally liberal,
conservative, or divided. 21 6 In one important respect, this method
would strengthen some of the general characterizations advanced in
Part II concerning the ideological balance of the Supreme Court in
the New Deal period, as compared with the system implemented here,
which instead carves out a middle group of scores for the moderate
position. Using the scoring system that this Article develops, the New
Deal Court appears more evenly divided across three camps than it
does liberal. 2 17 This method would prove problematic, however, in its
215

The information is not complete for every year, and notably the Martin-Quinn

scores are only available from 1937 through 2005. The circuit court data covers all
years in Table 3, with missing years from 1933 through 1936 and 2006.
216 At a minimum, this method of presentation would invite the need for an additional step-namely, grouping numbers into discrete categories-that is accom-

plished in Table 3.
217 Thus, the new system yields 3/4-3-3/2 for 1937 and 4/5-3/2-2 for 1938, whereas
the Martin-Quinn index yields six liberals and three conservatives for both years.
Appendix A allows for such comparisons for every year in Table 3. The double listed
scores reflect transitional years in which the Martin-Quinn database reports two separate scores for the outgoing (first listed) and incoming (second listed) Justices.
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failure to provide any basis for assessing claims that the Court was
motivated to realign its standing rules when it was increasingly prone
to issuing opinions that masked underlying intransitive preferences as
a result of a membership split over three persistent but nondominant
camps. And in any event, Appendix A, which contains all relevant
Martin-Quinn numerical data underlying Table 3, remains available
for such comparisons.
The difficulty concerning the early years is substantially abated
when we consider the size of the coalition-here the conservativeslosing power in the New Deal Court. Consider for example, the listed
years for the New Deal Court, 1937 through 1944, when President
Harry Truman came into power. Even without data for the year 1935,
we know from case law history that this was a landmark year in which a
simple majority of one moderate, Owen Roberts, and four conservatives, known as the "Four Horsemen,"2 18 struck down a number of
model New Deal programs. 2 19 We also know that in the year 1937,
aware of the threatened Court-packing plan, 220 the Court reversed
course and sustained programs that under the earlier jurisprudential
22 1
analysis it would presumably have struck down.
The data on the circuit courts for that period are remarkable. In
the first term of the FDR administration (1933-1937), the Republicans controlled between seven and nine of eleven circuits, while the
Democrats controlled only one to two. This remained the case in the
year 1937 in which the most significant New Deal set of doctrinal
reversals took place.
Using the scoring system developed here, the early data for the
Court from 1937 through 1939 show a split from 3/4-3-3/2 to 4/5-3/2-2
to 6-1-2 respectively. The numbers of liberals remained fairly constant
at four for a period of years, and beginning in 1941, the number of
conservatives remained fairly stable at one. While the number of centrists appears relatively high, it would belie general understandings
and common sense to characterize this as anything other than a liberal court. From the perspective of the holdover conservatives, this
was a Court that required only one of several available moderates to
218 The so-called "Four Horsemen" were Justices McReynolds, Butler, DeVanter,
and Sutherland. See STEARNS, supra note 21, at 220-23.
219 For a helpful discussion of this historical period, see WILLIAM E.
LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN 42-48 (1995).

220

See

STEARNS,

supra note 21, at 220-23.

221 See Gerald Gunther, Foreward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court:
A Modelfor a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1, 21-22, 37-38 (1972) (discussing the historical significance of the Supreme Court's jurisprudential changes in
1937).
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sustain a proffered liberal result. During this same period, the circuits

were also simultaneously trending in a consistently more liberal direction as the FDR administration was building replacements of the prior
conservative lower federal courts.
One might surmise from the data that the New Deal Court, having put standing in place to protect its doctrinal about face against
continued attacks in the lower federal courts, would then abandon
that doctrine in the early 1940s when the liberal appointees controlled not only the Supreme Court, but also the overwhelming majority of the circuit courts. 222 This seems implausible, however, for two
reasons. First, once the default standing doctrines were established,
they protected against categories of litigation that would have undermined the overall progressive liberal project of the increasingly Democratic controlled federal judiciary. Congress retained power to afford
standing within particular statutes, but absent such specific statutory
directives, the default doctrines limited access to federal courts as a
means of claiming harm from progressive regulatory interference in
the market. 223 While the data are consistent with the explanation that

standing doctrine was initially developed to discipline conservative
lower federal courts, it also remains consistent in this later period
when we consider that there was no underlying change in doctrinal
mandate that warranted doctrinal revision. This holds even though a
general ideological convergence had by then emerged between the
Supreme Court and the courts of appeals. Second, it is important to
bear in mind that the relationship between the Supreme Court and
the lower federal courts operates to some extent in a historical lag
rather than in real time. The nature of litigation is such that cases
often take considerable time to go from the district courts to the circuit courts and from the circuit courts to the Supreme Court. The
Court is to that extent time-lagged and a largely passive recipient of
appeals and certiorari petitions that reflect what has happened over
the past two to three years in the lower federal courts. 224 While time
lags make direct comparison within a given year more difficult, it is
important also to recognize that the Court's members are acutely
aware of appointments processes affecting the lower federal courts.
222 Notice the liberal ascent in Democratic control of the circuit courts reaching
eight out of eleven by 1941 and nine out of eleven by 1944, where it remained until
the Warren Court. See supra Table 3, years 1941-52.
223
224

See supra Part I.B.
See Michael Herz, The Supreme Court in Real Time: Haste, Waste, and Bush v.

Gore, 35 AKRON L. REv. 185, 187 (2002) ("Normally, a Supreme Court case involves
events that occurred years ago, and legal issues that have percolated through the
lower courts.").
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This is likely especially true of appointments to the federal courts of
appeals. As a result, while the passive data most readily availablenamely incoming cases on appeal and through petitions for certiorari-is backward looking, individual Justices are likely also to be, at
least to some extent, forward looking.
The resulting complexity might appear to render the ability to set
out any robust claims based upon the sort of numerical data
presented in Table 3 impossible. I would suggest, however, that this is
not only excessively pessimistic, but also contrary to the valuable
insights that one gains into the analysis of justiciability-especially
standing-when we compare the social choice analysis summarized in
Part I with the data assembled in Table 3.
As we have already seen, the explanation that standing doctrine
was originally motivated by a divergence in judicial philosophy
between the emerging New Deal Court and the conservative circuit
courts is well corroborated in the data. How about the broadening of
standing doctrine in the Warren Court period? The analysis suggests
that as the liberal Warren Court's center of gravity began to converge
with the more liberal federal courts of appeals, it was motivated to
broaden standing to further its emerging rights-driven jurisprudence.2 25 That jurisprudence operated in tension with the limited
understanding ofjusticiability, founded largely on notions of common
law injury, that undergirded the New Deal Court's standing
2 26
jurisprudence.
The Warren Court began with the appointments of Earl Warren
and William Brennan in 1953.227 The data suggest that as the Court
began to move left, the strength of the conservative block increased,
with four dominant conservatives in the years 1955-1958.228 The cir-

cuit court history demonstrates overwhelming dominance of Democratic appointed circuit court jurists, with nine to ten out of eleven
circuits controlled by Democratic appointees. This began to shift as
Eisenhower increasingly appointed circuit court judges. But once
again, the time lag is important in assessing the data. Assuming a twoto three-year informational time lag, the sense of Democratic convergence dominating both the Supreme Court and the circuit courts
would have lasted into the late 1950s. The data become more difficult
to interpret at this point because just when the Republicans took con225 See supra Part I.C.
226 See supra Part I.B.
227 See supra Part I.C.
228 These included Minton, Reed (then Whittaker), Jackson (then Harlan), and
Burton. See infra Appendix A columns 4, 7-9, years 1953-58.
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trol of the majority of the circuit courts, the Democrats resumed control of the White House for a period lasting from 1961 through 1969.
What is most noticeable is the emerging ideological dominance of the
liberal Warren Court in the late period, from 1966 through 1968, with
the dominance of Democratic controlled circuit courts in the same
period. It is during this period, and carrying over to the early Burger
Court period, that the Court announced some of its notably broad
22 9
standing decisions.
Now consider the somewhat earlier period in which the Warren
Court liberal majority increased while the circuit courts reverted temporarily to Republican control. The social choice theory of standing
might imply that the Warren Court would have imposed stricter limits
on standing doctrine in this period as the conservatives came to dominate the lower courts, but this did not occur. By the time of this shift,
beginning around 1958, the Warren Court's doctrinal mandate was
underway. And the liberal coalition was generally gaining strength.
Given the strength of the liberal coalition (which included crossover
moderates) ,230 this Court was also less likely to be concerned about
splits that emerged from the divided circuit courts since it had the
power to correct them on review. The nature of the newly identified
rights in the Warren Court required improved judicial access, rather
than protection from judicial interference, as had been the case with
the New Deal Court, which, following its rapidly changing doctrinal
transformations from 1935 through 1937, used standing to discipline
the lower federal courts from limiting the reach of those doctrinal
23 1
changes.
The data also create interesting interpretive questions concerning the Warren Court itself. In the early years especially, the data suggest that the Court lacked a dominant center of gravity and might
have been prone to cyclical preferences. And yet while the Court was
split over three gradations (using the scoring system developed here),
it was not likely subject to the same sort of coalition instability that
later came to characterize the Burger and Rehnquist Courts. That is
largely because of the nature of the substantive constitutional ques229 See supra Part I.C. It is notable that Justice Douglas authored Trafficante v.
MetropolitanLife Insurance Co., 409 U.S. 205, 206 (1972), for a unanimous Court with a

separate concurrence by Justice White joined by Justices Blackmun and Powell. Id. at
212 (White, J., concurring).
230 See supra Table 3, years 1953-68; infra Appendix A, columns 8-9, years
1962-68 (demonstrating the diminution of the conservative coalition by 1962 to one

or two members-Harlan, and sometimes Stewart-for the remainder of the Warren
Court).
231 See supra Part I.B.
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tions that the Court was called upon to address. Many of the contentious cases in this period involved the jurisprudential approach to take
in assessing the longstanding debate over whether the Fourteenth
Amendment incorporates the substantive provisions of the Bill of
Rights and how far to construe such rights.

23 2

The underlying ten-

sions involved the source of the underlying rights more so than the
propriety of a regime of judicially identified rights. 23 3

Provided a

majority agreed on incorporating a particular right or in extending
the scope of an existing right, even if doing so required more than a
single rationale, the Court coalesced in a liberal direction. In this
regime, the split over frameworks did not threaten to undermine the
Court's overall mission of using judicial power as a means of providing
guidance, increasingly with reference to the Bill of Rights, to the
2 34
lower federal judiciary.
The data support a very different thesis, however, concerning the
Burger and Rehnquist Courts lasting from 1969 through 2004. The
data on the circuit courts in this period are striking. They begin with
lopsided Democratic control at the beginning of the Burger Court
period and gradually move in the direction of increased Republican
control. 235 While the Carter administration made no Supreme Court
appointments, it reinstated Democratic control in a number of circuits. The net effect was to slow down what otherwise would appear to
be a smooth progression of Democratic to Republican control within
the lower federal judiciary. After the Rehnquist Court began, however, the steady progression favoring Republican control resumed
quickly, thus continuing the process of eventual conservative control
of the lower federal courts. In contrast with the Burger Court, therefore, the data show that the Rehnquist Court coincides with a notable
conservative ascent within the federal courts of appeals.
This historical series of events creates an anomaly for conventional political accounts of standing. Because the Rehnquist Court
was increasingly conservative and because the standing doctrine had
232 See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1968); Gideon v.
Wainright, 372 U.S. 335, 341-45 (1963).
233 See, e.g., Duncan, 391 U.S. at 149 n.14.
234 See, e.g., id. at 150 (discussing the increasing historical relevance of the Bill of
Rights in evaluating what qualifies as fundamental for purposes of incorporating
rights against states).
235 It is worth noting that the years 1971-72 report a dominant conservative coalition of five, see supra Table 3. Beginning in this period the Court issued Trafficante
(1972), Eisenstadt (1972), and Roe (1973), demonstrating once again the need to
inform these data with specific knowledge ofjudicial developments in relevant historical periods.
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been developed to further a progressive liberal judicial philosophy
from being threatened in conservative controlled lower federal courts,
assuming a strict political motivation, why did the Rehnquist Court
not abandon, or at least retreat from, strict standing doctrine? One
possible answer is that the Rehnquist Court's conservatism was
targeted against a different liberal philosophy than New Deal progressivism. Instead, it was aimed at retrenching the Warren Court's liberal
rights-driven jurisprudence. The Rehnquist Court's standing doctrine
was thus motivated to limit access to the federal courts to further bolster judicially created rights. The data reveal a fundamental difficulty,
however, with this account, and in doing so further bolster the social
choice account.
From quite early on in the Rehnquist Court, and continuing
throughout, the conservatives overwhelmingly controlled the lower
federal courts. Had the Supreme Court had the wherewithal to
retrench substantively on liberal doctrine, it would not have invited
the resistance in the lower federal courts that motivated the original
standing doctrine or needed the doctrine to ensure against newly created rights. And yet, the Rehnquist Court continued the Burger
Court project with respect to standing, which was to bolster the doctrine and give it a constitutional foundation. 23 6 The alternative social
choice account, which the data generally support, 23 7 suggests that the
real motivation for reintroducing strong-form standing doctrine was
to reduce the doctrinal risks associated with path dependence in the
Supreme Court itself. The persistence of the three jurisprudential
camps-liberal holdovers from the earlier Warren era (or appoint23 8
ments who for one reason or another moved in that direction);
core conservatives, meaning those willing to overturn disfavored
precedents; 2 39 and moderate conservatives, those who preferred caseby-case determinations of disfavored precedents, often ruling on narrow procedural grounds 24 0-increased the risk of indeterminate doc236 See supra Part I.D.
237 The hardest years for this account are 1987-90, which show a solid five-Justice
conservative bloc. This bloc, however, includes Justices O'Connor and White, whose
voting records over the longer term did not prove consistently conservative. See infra
Appendix A, columns 7, 9, years 1987-89.
238 This bloc has included a combination of the following Justices: Brennan (then
Souter), Blackmun (then Breyer), Stevens, and Ginsburg (replacing the sometimes
moderate, sometimes conservative White). See infra Appendix A (providing timeline).
239 This bloc has included a combination of the following Justices: Rehnquist,
Scalia, Thomas, and sometimes White. See Appendix A.
240 This bloc has included one or more of the following Justices: Powell (then
Kennedy), O'Connor, and sometimes White (replaced by the liberal Ginsburg). See
Appendix A.
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trine. This persistent judicial structure did so by increasing the
relevant options as part of the choice set when older liberal prece24 1
dents were invited for challenge.
In addition, as discussed more fully below, it is a mistake to imagine that rights-driven jurisprudence is inherently liberal and that limited judicial access is inherently conservative. Remember that
precisely the reverse held true in the New Deal Court period. 2 42 Even
today, some rights claims, including property rights and religion
claims, are conservative, and denials of access would favor liberals on
those issues. If the Court managed to retrench on the Warren Court's
liberal reading of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause
in favor of an earlier view associating due process with economic
rights, then the balance once again could shift in the same direction,
such that broadening judicial access would favor conservative jurisprudence over a significant set of issues. The predictably favorable resolution on the merits that a conservative Supreme Court and lower
federal judiciary would ensure would then prevent a relaxed standing
doctrine from favoring a liberal jurisprudence on others.
The data generally bear this theory out. Throughout both the
Burger and Rehnquist Court periods, there is a diminution in control
by any single ideological bloc as compared with the latter half of the
Warren Court period. While the numbers appear to move in the
direction of increased conservative membership, using the MartinQuinn scoring system, core conservatives held sway for a limited number of years in the early Rehnquist period (1987-1990), but then gave
way to a series of years in which the liberals and moderates collectively
held a majority. Most notably, beginning in 1997 and continuing
through 2002, the split among the coalitions was lopsided, with heavy
membership (four in each instance) in the liberal and conservative
camps, and only Justice O'Connor, sometimes Kennedy, holding the
middle. 243 It is noteworthy that a single moderate jurist is sufficient
for a lack of predictability in a 4-14 Court. One remarkable feature of
the Rehnquist Court has been the stability ofjust such a regime (occasionally switching to 4-2-3), since roughly 1997.244
The social choice account suggests that the more robust explanation of standing throughout this period is that the Burger Court
241 See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
242 See supra Part I.B.
243 The data reveal that from 1997 through 2004, Justice O'Connor assumed the
position of moderate from 1998 through 2004, while Justice Kennedy assumed the
position of moderate in the years 1997-98 and 2003-04. See Martin et al., supra note
9, at 1305.
244 See supra Table 3, years 1974-2004.
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sought to control both the lower federal courts, which for some significant set of years continued to favor liberal control, 24 5 and itself
against the increased risk of issuing unpredictable outcomes that
resulted from carefully timed or sequenced litigation. While the
Rehnquist Court witnessed a dramatic shift favoring conservative control of the lower federal courts, interrupted but never overtaken by
Clinton's lower court appointments, it did not resolve the issue of
internal loose coalitions. The Court thus elected to retain and bolster
standing doctrine at a time when it was not able to fully benefit from
what otherwise would prove a strong conservative alliance with the
lower federal courts. Instead, it limited access to the federal judiciary
in general as a means of disciplining its own loose coalitions in addition to litigants who would seek the benefit of manipulating case
orders to affect substantive doctrine.
III.

A.

THE FUTURE OF STANDING DOCTRINE

The Roberts Court in HistoricalPerspective

The combined data include numbers for the 2005 Roberts Court
Term. The evidence supports the expectation that Justice Alito has
provided a fourth core conservative, joining Roberts (who assumes
roughly the same position as Rehnquist), Scalia, and Thomas. The
Court now appears to be split 4-14, in contrast with the split in the
prior two years of 4-2-3.246 While the conservative coalition is
undoubtedly strengthened, the Court nonetheless remains unstable
and subject to the whims of the single remaining moderate conservative. Now imagine instead that the Court witnesses a replacement of a
liberal (perhaps Stevens or Ginsburg) or the remaining moderate
conservative (Kennedy) with a core conservative. At this point, there
will be a predictable conservative majority aligned with an overwhelmingly conservative controlled set of lower federal courts.2 47 This Court
would not need to discipline the lower federal courts, its ideological
245 A majority of the circuit courts remained in Democratic control until 1969-74,
although the numbers were steadily declining, and during 1978 and 1980-84, the
Democrats regained control as a result of the Carter administration, after which the
numbers again progressed toward Republican control. See supra Table 3.
246 See supra Table 3, years 2003-04.
247 The numbers in Table 3 are significant. The present composition of the Roberts Court is 4-1-4, as Alito replaced one of the two moderate positions with a conservative position. Replacing one of the liberals or moderates with a conservative
would change this to either 3-1-5 or 4-0-5. And of course more than one Republican
replacement would move that balance even further in favor of conservative control.
As for the circuit courts, nine out of twelve are dominated by Republican appointed
judges (with two dominated by Democratic appointed judges and one tie), and if we
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allies. Nor would it be much concerned about the predictability of its
own outcomes. On the most critical issues that the Court would face,
it would be capable of anticipating core conservative rulings.
Relaxing standing would facilitate the flexibility to accomplish this by
allowing lower federal courts to operate as full partners with the predictably conservative Supreme Court.
This is not to suggest that with one more conservative appointment the Roberts Court will suddenly mark a wholesale retreat in
standing doctrine. Rather, if the Republicans continue control of the
White House, and make one or two more appointments to the
Supreme Court, replacing liberals or moderates with conservatives,
while also continuing to actively maintain their numbers (perhaps
even improving them from a conservative perspective) in the circuit
courts, the Court will no longer be motivated to continue standing
doctrine in its present strict form.

2 48

In this regard, the doctrinal

anomalies-or claimed inconsistencies-of standing doctrine will
prove a significant benefit in allowing the Court to signal change without a formal abandonment. 249 As previously stated, for every articulated rule, there appears to be a readily available exception. 250
Signaling increased flexibility in the application of standing doctrine
does not require ending longstanding doctrine. Rather, it requires
emphasizing features of existing doctrine that are broader within particular cases.
To some extent, the Court has recently used standing doctrine in
this manner. Consider, for example, Bennett v. Spear,251 a case in
which the Court afforded standing to limit the application of the
Endangered Species Act in a manner that threatened to impose economic harms to ranchers and developers. 2 52 By construing citizen
standing sufficiently broadly to embrace claims that operate in direct
opposition to the overall thrust of the statute-one aimed, after all, at
species preservation, not pocketbook protection against species presinclude senior judges, the number shifts to eleven to one in favor of Republican
appointed control. See supra Table 3, years 2004-06.
248 As previously suggested, despite the stress that a core conservative majority on
the Supreme Court, aligned with a conservative lower federal judiciary, would place
on standing doctrine, depending upon the strength of some jurists' commitments to
particular standing theories-for example, justice Scalia's commitment to a theory
grounded in Article II-further conservative Supreme Court appointments might be
necessary to change standing doctrine. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
249 And of course formal abandonment would make reinstating the doctrines
more difficult should circumstances later change.
250 See supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
251 520 U.S. 154 (1997).
252 See id. at 167-71.
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ervation-the majority signaled that for a certain class of economic
injuries, standing is broadly construed, even though for more attenuated claims of injury, even if they push in the overall direction of the
statute, as in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,253 standing will be strictly
enforced. 25 4 Notice also that this broadening of standing did not
require overruling Lujan. Rather, it required a broader application of
the zone of interest test, a doctrine well embedded within the doc255
trine of statutory standing.
The Court could similarly emphasize aspects of standing that are
more generous as a means of facilitating other conservative or economic rights-driven jurisprudence within the lower federal courts, and
thus eventually on the Court itself. And notice that based upon the
strength of the ideological alignment between the Supreme Court
and the lower federal courts, the Court could also use the liberalization of standing to facilitate substantive doctrinal expansions in the
lower courts without having to bear the full political pressure that
results from such doctrinal change, as for example did the New Deal
Court.
There is precedent for this sort of tactic as well. In the 1996 decision, Hopwood v. Texas, 256 a split panel of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Fifth Circuit struck down the University of Texas
School of Law's affirmative action policy, where that policy involved
the segregated use of files based upon race. 25 7 The Hopwood majority

determined that Bakke was not good law because Justice Powell's split
holding, which struck down the challenged quota-based affirmative
action program and which permitted the use of race to further diversity in higher education, was set out in an opinion, the controlling
parts of which only the author had agreed to. 2 58 In contrast, Judge

Weiner, specially concurring, admonished the majority that it was not
the job of the Fifth Circuit to anticipatorily overturn even disfavored
Supreme Court precedents. 259 One might imagine that the Supreme
Court would have granted certiorari to reassert its authority to deter-

253 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992).
254 See Bennett, 520 U.S. at 167-72, 175-76.
255 See STEARNS, supra note 21, at 265-68, 288-89.
256 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
257 Id. at 962.
258 For a discussion of what constitutes holding and dicta within this opinion, see
Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 123, at 1058-60.
259 See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 963 (Weiner, J., concurring) ("[I]f Bakke is to be
declared dead, the Supreme Court, not a threejudge panel of a circuit court, should
make that pronouncement.").
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mine when its precedents should be discarded, 260 but it did not do so
in Hopwood, apparently content to allow the Fifth Circuit to get out in
front and limit the reach of a precedent that an emerging conserva26 1
tive majority disfavored.
A relaxation of standing, similar to the Warren Court's broadening of then existing standing rules, would facilitate this sort of interaction in which the Court would benefit from active engagement in
limiting the liberal rights-driven jurisprudence, perhaps even
retrenching upon it, and possibly furthering a more conservative
rights-driven jurisprudence. Loosening the valves that control access
to the lower federal courts would facilitate this mutually beneficial
partnering relationship, thus taking stress off the Supreme Court for
bringing about doctrinal change, while still facilitating desired doctrinal results. Failing to take such cases on review would provide a powerful signal to more reticent sister circuits, allowing them to follow
those circuits that have taken the lead in moving doctrine in their
preferred conservative direction. And when circuit courts reach the
seeming limits of where Supreme Court doctrine will allow them to
go, at least assuming the lower federal courts-in contrast with the
Fifth Circuit in Hopwood-respect such limits, the Court is obviously
free to enter the fray through grants of certiorari with far greater control in predicting the outcomes of those cases it elects to decide than
had characterized the Burger and Rehnquist Courts.
B.

Some Objections Considered

This Article has relied upon newly constructed data to support
the social choice account of standing doctrine and to offer predictions
about future directions of standing doctrine in the Roberts Court.
Making predictions about judicial behavior is inherently risky, and
260 The Court has made such pronouncements in the past. See State Oil Co. v.
Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997) ("[I]t is this Court's prerogative alone to overrule one of
its precedents."); see also Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S.
477, 484 (1989) ("If a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet
appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of
Appeals should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.").
261 Of course, Grutterv. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343-44 (2003) (sustaining the University of Michigan School of Law affirmative action program, which employed a moving target centered on creating a "critical mass" of specified minorities, against an
equal protection challenge), and Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 275-76 (2003) (striking down the University of Michigan undergraduate affirmative action program,
which employed a point scoring system for race, as violating equal protection), ended
all of that by essentially codifying the Bakke regime. See Grutter,539 U.S. at 325; Gratz,
539 U.S. at 271.

2oo8]

STANDING

AT

THE CROSSROADS

this is no different. Just as econometrics is often most robust in
explaining the past, as unanticipated contingencies have the potential
to throw even the most sophisticated models off course, so too here,
any number of factors could derail the prediction that the emerging
ideological alignment between the Supreme Court and the circuit
courts would motivate a relaxation of standing. Certainly this is true,
and I can only anticipate some objections here. This Article obviously
cannot address unpredictable historical events. The theory is dependent upon several assumptions, and if those do not succeed, then the
predictions also might not come to pass. This Article offers no prediction on the presidential races of 2008 or thereafter. If a Democratic
President makes the next series of Supreme Court appointments, and
if he or she also moves the Supreme Court and circuit courts back in
the direction of a more even balance or even of liberal control, then
the predictive theory advanced here will not apply. 262 Or at least it

would not apply in the near future. Of course, as the Carter administration showed, it is also possible that a one term Democratic adminis263
tration would mark only a temporary retreat from a broader trend.
If so, this would only render this Article's prediction premature. And
yet, even if the assumptions in the preceding analysis do hold, there
remain important objections to consider. I have addressed some
briefly in the preceding Parts, but will tackle them more systematically
here. The three principal objections are that (1) standing is a conservative doctrine designed to limit liberal rights-driven jurisprudence; (2) existing statutory standing rules favor conservative
jurisprudence, especially as related to congressional grants of standing; and (3) the Supreme Court is generally resistant to announcing
radical doctrinal change. We will now take each objection in turn.
1. Standing as a Conservative Doctrine Targeting Liberal Rights
Jurisprudence
The thesis that this Article advances is likely to be counterintuitive to many readers. Standing has been a prominent feature of the
jurisprudence of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts. The general wisdom is that the doctrine is associated with restricting liberal rightsbased jurisprudence, and is to that extent a conservative doctrine, or
set of doctrines. If these premises are correct, then it would seem
peculiar indeed to imagine that with a stronger push in a conservative
direction, not only on the Supreme Court itself but also in the federal
262 Of course the benefits of the data and the historical analysis of standing based
upon social choice theory would remain unaffected.
263 See supra Table 3, years 1977-80.
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courts of appeals, the Court would then be motivated to relax standing. The response to this argument is twofold. First, this characterization of standing is at best partial and ahistorical. As this Article has
shown, standing was created in the New Deal Court to advance a progressive liberal regulatory agenda and was only later transformed into
a set of tools to advance the interests of a conservative Supreme
Court.

264

This of course is not a complete answer, however. Even assuming
that this story about the transformation of standing is correct, the
question remains whether relaxing standing doctrine today would further judicial objectives of value to conservatives. I believe that the
answer to that question is "yes."
First, it is mistaken to equate rights-driven jurisprudence with
political or ideological liberalism and retrenchment of rights-driven
jurisprudence with conservatism. The New Deal jurisprudential era
provides a ready counter to such a characterization. Prior to the radical doctrinal transformations in the New Deal, the Supreme Court
had relied upon a rights-driven understanding of due process to
advance a host of economic liberties-freedom of contract and freedom of property centrally among them-to restrict regulatory intervention into private market orderings. 2 65 Few judges today are
advocating a return to the Lochner era, but certainly among conservative academic commentators, this is an increasingly prominent and
respectable position. 26 6 But even if we do not go so far as to suggest
an effort to revive economic substantive due process, there exist other
"conservative" rights. These include, at a minimum, the right to
develop property and the right to engage in particular religious practices. 26 7 In at least one instance, the Court has already broadened
268
standing to further such claims.
The Supreme Court could also confer standing to challenge various liberal spending programs that contravene religious or other conservative objections. To that extent, a variation on the liberal Elast
264 See supra Part I.B-D.
265 See LEUCITENBURG, supra note 219, at 42-48.
266 For an intriguing article that supports this position, see Jeffrey Rosen, The
Unregulated Offensive, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2005, § 6 (Magazine), at 42 (discussing the
"Constitution in Exile" movement).
267 For a recent article that describes the policy shift within the Bush administration Department of Justice to emphasize claims related to denials of religious liberty
over claims related to race-based discrimination, see Neil A. Lewis, Justice Dept.
Reshapes Its Civil Rights Mission, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2007, at Al.
268 See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 179 (1997) (conferring standing to allow a
challenge to the application of the Endangered Species Act based upon the financial
concerns resulting from potential limitations on development).
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standing decision from the Warren Court period might eventually
find reflection in the emerging Roberts Court. It is even possible that
federalism jurisprudence might find refuge in the Court's recent
standing decision, Massachusetts v. EPA,269 if, for example, the Court
conferred standing upon states claiming that federal civil rights laws
benefit all persons without regard to minority racial status or that federal environmental statutes, as seen in Bennett, must be enforced to
accommodate local economic concerns.
Of course the federal judiciary can expedite reversals of liberal
rights by broadening standing as well. While this might not appear an
effective long-term strategy, relaxing standing rules will encourage
efforts to articulate new rights, or to apply previously announced
rights, on new facts. These cases might also allow the courts in which
the claims are raised to retrench, rather than to expand, such rights
by denying the claims. In the course of doing so, courts can also suggest in dicta broader retrenchments that will invite other claims to
raise more ambitious rights-restricting challenges.
2.

Existing Standing Rules Favor Conservative Jurisprudence,
Especially as Related to Congressional Grants of Standing

One might further object that unlike liberal rights, conservative
rights do not require relaxed standing. The argument harkens back
to the famous dictum in Linda R.S., namely that Congress can, by statute, allow standing where it would not exist but for the statute itself.270
This proved important to liberal rights jurisprudence to the extent
that liberal claims of standing are rooted in rights that lack strong
counterparts in the common law of tort, contract, or property. There
are many cases that illustrate this proposition, but here I will mention
just a few: the right to prevent harm to habitats of endangered species,27 1 the right to prevent enforcement of regulatory action that will
harm the environment,2 72 and the right to enforce a statute against a
claimed discriminatory practice. 273 In each example, the claimed
right is one that arguably lacks a strong common law analogue and
instead is premised either on an extension of principles drawn from
269

127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007).

270 Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 618 (1973); see supra note 95 and
accompanying text.
271

See Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
272 See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7 4 01- 7 6 7 1q (West 2003 & Supp. 2007); Clean
Water Act, 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1387 (West 2001 & Supp. 2007).
273

See Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (2000).
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an existing constitutional provision, for example equal protection, or
a legislatively constructed claim.
Certainly this has characterized many claims that were newly
developed in the Warren Court era and often extended or modified
in the later Burger and Rehnquist Courts. At one level, that fact
might counsel in favor of an incentive to limit standing as the Court
moves forward. And yet, in some cases, the vindication of any articulated right that we can characterize as liberal requires thwarting a
potential counter-right that we can characterize as conservative.
Standing to prevent federal subsidization of discriminatory private
schools thwarts the right of private schools to engage in whatever policies they seek to further, perhaps motivated by religious belief, unimpeded by federal regulatory or judicial interference. Standing to
prevent discrimination in housing runs in tension with the claimed
right of property owners to select with whom they wish to deal in decisions to lease or sell. Standing to prevent federal subsidization of
developments harming the habitats of endangered species thwarts
developers' rights to construct on private lands or the government's
power to fund programs abroad unimpeded by claimed nuisance law
suits. But even if each of these claims could be couched in common
law terms, that merely underscores the potential benefits of a relaxed
standing doctrine or at least of permitting broader standing than
existing federal statutes might allow. And as we have seen, by broadening statutory standing, a conservative Supreme Court can redirect
liberal statutory schemes to elevate conservative interests, which had
previously been at most a counterbalancing consideration, even at the
274
expense of thwarting the statute's main objectives.
A more difficult issue is whether the existing constitutional standing rules benefit conservative jurisprudence in the event that a liberal
Congress affords broader access to the federal courts through liberalized standing. Certainly in the environmental area, this has often
been a method of augmenting governmental enforcement of federal
regulatory regimes respecting clean air, water, and endangered species. 275

The Supreme Court has, to some extent, vacillated on

whether its constitutional rules apply as strictly to Congress as they do
to those relying upon broad constitutional provisions as the basis for
standing. 27 6 Although not without limitations, 2 77 Congress generally
274
275

See supra note 268 and accompanying text.
See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2000) (citizen suit provision); Clean Water

Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2000) (same); Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)
(2000) (same).
276 See generally Stearns, supra note 133 (discussing standing in Lujan and
Laidlaw).
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has the power to avoid the prudential standing barriers, and can thus
confer standing on third parties and render legally diffuse claims specific to individual litigants. The question, however, remains whether
allowing Congress flexibility in defining injury in fact, causation, and
redressability would undermine conservative jurisprudential goals.
For example, to the extent that conservative jurisprudence is consistent with vindicating substantive claims related to property rights,
traditional tort-based criteria might tend to further that objective.
There are two countervailing considerations. First, it is possible
that the price of broadening access to the federal judiciary more generally to receive the benefits of allowing these courts to get in front
and take pressure off the Supreme Court in moving doctrine in a
more conservative direction will include some flexibility in the realm
of statutory standing. This might be true even if some specific applications allow a more liberal set of litigants to seek to expand the reach
of broad federal regulatory programs. At least for some conservative
jurists, jurisprudential conservativism might include allowing Congress to make statutory policy in such areas even if it facilitates some
results with which the Court disagrees. 2 78 Second, there is at least
some data to support the view that relaxing traditional standing criteria in the statutory context will allow advancement of more traditional, and perhaps conservative, rights.
In Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC),
279
Inc.,
for example, Justice Ginsburg, writing for a majority, conferred
standing upon a group of private litigants under the Clean Water Act
who challenged a wastewater treatment plant's failure to comply with
requirements of an emissions permit. 28 0 One of the difficulties in the
case was that the permits were apparently based upon a calculation
error, and as a result, the claimed violations did not produce any documented environmental harm. 28 1 For Justice Ginsburg, such a showing was unnecessary. Instead, the issue was simply noncompliance
with the permit.28 2 In contrast, Justice Scalia, writing in dissent, con277 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559-62 (1992).
278 Cf id. at 579-81 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that "Congress has the
power to define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a case
or controversy where none existed before," and refusing to foreclose the possibility
that arguably tenuous claims of injury based upon an "ecosystem nexus" or "animal
nexus" could nonetheless constitute ajusticiable injury in fact sufficient to satisfy constitutional standing requirements).
279

528 U.S. 167 (2000).

280 See id. at 173-74.
281 See Steams, supra note 133, at 378 n.180.
282 Ginsburg stated:
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tinued to insist upon a chain from the permit violation to an environmental harm to harm to the individual, and on that basis rejected the
various claims to standing. 28 3 While Scalia rejected all claims to standing, it is worth considering one substantive argument for standing that
sought to vindicate a claim grounded in a conservative right, specifically the right to avoid a diminution in the value of property resulting,
from the publicity attendant the permit violations. 284 At least if we
accept Scalia's rejection of this argument for standing as an indication, in order for Congress to allow an individual standing to challenge private action that violates a federal statute, even to pursue a
personal financial injury, it might be necessary to broaden standing
rules relative to Lujan.
Of course one might imagine any number of contexts in which
individual claimants will seek to further conservative interests through
the process of litigation, even if they are not the direct beneficiaries,
as for example might occur following a government decision to
restrict access to the public square to place a creche, the Ten Commandments, or some other set of religious symbols; to facilitate the
free exercise of a religious practice involving groups in which the
claimant is not a member (analogous to allowing claimants to pursue
challenges to discriminatory housing to receive the benefits of living
in an integrated community); or to allow private development that
might have a benefit in gentrifying a blighted neighborhood, but
where the benefits are sufficiently dispersed that only an interest
group, or an ideologically motivated litigant, would bring the claim.
It is always difficult to predict the precise shape that future litigation
will bring, but these examples suffice to counter any argument of a
necessary inconsistency between employing broadened statutory
standing and the pursuit of conservative rights.

The relevant showing for purposes of Article III standing... is not injury to
the environment but injury to the plaintiff. To insist upon the former rather
than the latter ... is to raise the standing hurdle higher than the necessary
showing for success on the merits in an action alleging noncompliance with
[the required] permit.
Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 181.
283 Thus, Scalia stated: "While it is perhaps possible that a plaintiff could be
harmed even though the environment was not, such a plaintiff would have the burden of articulating and demonstrating the nature of that injury." Id. at 199 (ScaliaJ.,
dissenting).
284 See id. at 202.
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The Supreme Court's Resistance to Announcing Radical
Doctrinal Change

A final argument against this Article's predictive thesis is that the
Supreme Court itself benefits from the very doctrinal flexibility that
has led commentators to criticize standing doctrine. Announcing a
broad set of standing rules might prevent the Court from using standing to limit access to the federal courts at some time in the future.
This is especially likely should the balance of federal judicial power
once again change in a disfavored direction from the perspective of
conservative jurists.
This is almost certainly correct, and the proper response requires
that we revisit this Article's more limited predictive claim. Recall that
I am not arguing that the Supreme Court will be motivated to abandon standing in wholesale fashion. In fact, the very flexibility of the
doctrines will allow the Court to effectuate the objectives that I claim
without the need to signal radical doctrinal revision of standing in
particular, or justiciability more generally. Recall also the criticism
that every standing doctrine comes equipped with exceptions. Broadening standing merely requires emphasizing those cases that are more
expansive or even that language within particular cases that signals a
more expansive scope to standing doctrine. An important implication
of this analysis is that the Roberts Court can select to emphasize and
deemphasize particular aspects of standing doctrine without effectuating any fundamental transformation in standing case law. For example, as between Lujan, which suggests limited congressional
prerogatives to effectuate standing in nontraditional (no common law
analogue) areas, and Laidlaw, which suggests the opposite, the Court
can more favorably cite the latter. As between Allen, which suggests
that the Court will not confer standing to second-guess regulations
alleged to violate equal protection that are claimed to adversely affect
markets affecting individuals, and Bakke, which suggests the opposite,
the Court can emphasize the latter. The Court can prefer third party
standing cases like Miller v. Albright,28 5 that allow parties not technically subject to a rule but who are nonetheless practical parties of
interest, 28 6 to Gilmore v. Utah, which gives legal formalism a higher
status. 28 7 And the Court can emphasize decisions that permit Congress power to define broad interests as enforceable individual rights,
285 523 U.S. 420 (1998).
286 Id. at 433 (plurality opinion).
287 429 U.S. 1012, 1013-15 (1976) (Burger, CJ., concurring) (rejecting standing
of petitioner's mother seeking relief on his behalf).
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like Laidlaw, rather than decisions that suggest the contrary, like
Lujan.
The critical point is that the flexibility of standing doctrine will
prove a strength in that it will allow the Court to claim doctrinal continuity, while sending a powerful signal to those who matter, namely
lower federal court judges. These judges speak the Court's language
and will happily take the intended bait. They will view such signals as
an invitation to more aggressively invite claims testing the limits of a
newly emerging conservative rights jurisprudence and to retrench, as
much as the Supreme Court's substantive doctrines will allow, disfavored liberal rights held over from a very different judicial era.
The power to do this without formally announcing a change in
doctrine is not a weakness of the thesis, but a strength. The Court will
be motivated to work below the radar, allowing the partnering lower
federal courts to do much of its bidding. When the circuit courts run
up against clear limitations based upon existing Supreme Court precedent, the Supreme Court can then step into the fray, knowing that,
unlike the New Deal Court, it has a friendly lower federal judiciary,
ready to implement its new set of doctrinal mandates.
CONCLUSION

The standing doctrine is at once a set of substantive rules and a
set of rules about how substantive doctrine is made. It is about the
timing of decisions and the perceived fairness of rules governing who
presents cases, what form the cases should take, and when they can be
brought. A set of doctrines targeted to such ends is, not surprisingly,
flexible. The doctrine changes in response to changing conditions,
and has done so since its inception in the New Deal. This Article
presents a seemingly radical yet simple idea. Given its increasingly
strong conservative core and its ideological alignment with the lower
federal judiciary, with one or more conservative appointments, the
Roberts Court will have much the same incentives respecting the
broadening of standing doctrine as a means to push substantive doctrine in its preferred direction as did the Warren Court. Whether or
not this thesis truly is radical, one thing should now be clear: for
nearly seventy years, the Supreme Court has retooled standing to further some other, larger doctrinal set of objectives. At bottom, this
Article merely questions why the emerging conservative Roberts Court
would be somehow immune from such incentives.
This Article began with the conventional account of the Roberts
Court. That story suggests that the Court has thus far moved one
increment to the right. While we can plot the Court along a contin-
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uum and visualize such a simple spatial movement, we should not
assume that the relationship between ideological increments on the
Court and the incentives to move doctrine is strictly linear. Another
one-ninth incremental move in the Court will produce the incentives-and the opportunity-for far more than a one-ninth incremental move in the ideological direction of doctrine. The result will be to
exert pressure on the present strict form of standing doctrine, which
otherwise will impede progress toward this result. This Article
predicts that over time, the Court will succumb to such pressures in an
effort to ease the path in advancing its desired doctrinal legacy.
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B.

AT THE CROSSROADS

JUDICIAL STATISTICS METHODOLOGY

The circuit court data was developed from the Federal Judges
Biographical Database (http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf) compiled by the FederalJudicial Center. All numbers are forJanuary 1 of
the year stated. This date was chosen because it was assumed that confirmations and terminations would not take place on January 1. Confirmations or terminations by this date would slightly alter the
presented data to that extent.
The following are the specific search criteria within the database.
Total Number of Judges:
Searches were done using the following criteria:
* Court (each circuit selected separately)
* Party of Nominating President
* Confirmation Date (date before January 1 of the year listed)
* Termination Date (date after January 1 of the year listed)
For the 1960s and 1970s, to determine the number ofjudges still
currently sitting, searches were also done using the following criteria:
* Court Type (U.S. Courts of Appeals)
* Party of Nominating President
* Confirmation Date (date before January 1 of 1969 or 1979)
* Limit Query to Sitting Judges (all sitting judges chosen)
For the 1980s and 1990s, to determine the judges who were currently sitting, searches generated lists for each circuit using the following criteria:
* Court (each circuit searched separately)
* Party of Nominating President
* Confirmation Date (date before January 1 of either 1989 or
1999)
0 Limit Query to SittingJudges (all sitting judges chosen)
We then looked up the nominating President and the dates of
confirmation, beginning of senior status, and termination, and created charts, which were then counted manually to generate numbers,
and these numbers were added together manually for each circuit.
Number of SeniorJudges:
Searches were done using the following criteria:
* Court (each circuit selected separately)
* Party of Nominating President
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* Confirmation Date (date before January 1 of the year listed)
" Retirement from Active Service (date before January 1 of
the year listed)
* Termination Date (date after January 1 of the year listed)
For earlier years, where there were not many senior judges, a
search was done for each year using the criteria:
" Court type (U.S. Court of Appeals)
* Confirmation Date (date before January 1 of the year listed)
* Retirement from Active Service date (date before January 1
of the year listed)
" Termination Date (date after January 1 of the year listed)
We then looked at each judge to determine the circuit and the
party of the nominating President and created a chart for each year.
Beginning with years where there are judges appointed who are
currently sitting (1960s), searches were also done using the following
criteria:
* Court (each circuit selected separately)
" Party of Nominating President
* Confirmation Date (date before January 1 of the year listed)
* Retirement from Active Service (date before January 1 of
the year listed)
" Limit Query to Sitting Judges (all sitting judges selected)
These numbers were manually added to the numbers of judges
no longer sitting (i.e., with termination dates) generated by the
searches described above.
For the Eleventh Circuit, there was no accurate way to use the
search criteria of the database to generate numbers, most likely
because many judges were transferred over from the Fifth Circuit in
1981. So, we instead generated a list of all judges who have ever
served on the Eleventh Circuit (twenty-nine) and, by looking at their
biographies, manually generated the numbers for both total and
senior judges.
Number of Active Judges:
All of these numbers were generated by manually subtracting the
number of senior judges from the total number.
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Note:
For the 1980s and 1990s, to determine the judges who were currently sitting, we generated lists for each circuit, using the following
criteria
* Court (each circuit searched separately)
* Party of Nominating President
* Confirmation Date (date before January 1 of either 1989 or
1999)
We then looked up the nominating President and the dates of
confirmation, beginning of senior status, and termination, and created charts, which were counted manually to generate numbers.
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